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SUMMARY
This thesis considers the design and analysis of humanitarian supply chains, by
which we mean those systems that deliver goods and services in response to natural
or man-made disasters as well as ongoing public health challenges. In the first part
of the thesis, we introduce a class of problems motivated by humanitarian logistics
systems with decentralized decision makers. In contrast to traditional optimization
problems in which a centralized planner determines the actions of all entities in the
system, decentralized systems are characterized by individual decision makers who
make choices to optimize their own objectives and whose actions impact the overall
system performance. Decentralized systems often perform poorly in comparison to
centralized ones, but centralization is costly or impractical to implement in many
circumstances. The goal of this part of the thesis is to characterize the impact of de-
centralized decision making and identify ways to mitigate this impact. Using concepts
from optimization and game theory, we model systems in which individuals choose
a facility to visit to receive service, such as during a disaster response, making their
choices based on travel time, congestion, and weights on congestion. These weights
represent the relative importance individuals place on congestion in their objectives.
We provide an efficient algorithm for finding a stable, or equilibrium, solution from
which no individual can improve her own objective value by switching unilaterally. We
show that the worst- and best-case performances of decentralized solutions depend on
the importance individuals place on congestion. Finally, we introduce a mechanism
that, if implemented, ensures that any chosen solution is also a stable decentralized
solution; the chosen solution could be the optimal solution found by a centralized
planner, for example. The mechanism acts by influencing the importance individuals
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place on congestion, and we characterize the values that this importance can and
must be to achieve stability. We introduce models to find values of the mechanism
that optimize particular policy objectives and show that these models can be solved
efficiently.
The second part of the thesis describes the application of the ideas developed in
the first part to data from a large-scale effort to deliver a limited supply of products to
a large number of people in a short time. The goal of this part of the thesis is to under-
stand the impact of decentralized decision making on local access to an actual product
and quantify correlations between inequities in access and socioeconomic variables.
We find that both the centralized and decentralized systems lead to inequity in access,
but the impact is greater in decentralized systems with user choice. The differences
in access are correlated with several socioeconomic variables, including income and
racial/ethnic minority group, but these relationships vary across geographic space.
This study integrates tools from optimization, game theory, spatial statistics, and
geographic information systems in a novel way. The results confirm the importance
of accounting for decentralized behavior in system design and point to opportunities
to use the mechanism from the first part of the thesis in future distribution efforts of
this nature. The study also leads to policy recommendations, namely that planners
consider the impact on equity prior to implementing distribution plans and work to
recruit additional service providers in areas that have exhibited inequities in the past.
The third part of the thesis employs empirical methods to characterize a successful
humanitarian supply chain and identify practices from which other organizations can
learn to improve their operations. The hurricane response process used by Waffle
House Restaurants has been recognized nationally for its effectiveness. We document
the process and describe the supply chain concepts that contribute to its success.
Further, we place the company’s practices in the context of the literature on supply
chain disruption, crisis management, and humanitarian logistics. This study provides
xii
insight for other organizations that seek to improve their resilience to supply chain
disruptions, whether these are caused by natural disasters or other events. The study
also led to the creation of teaching materials to help business and engineering students
identify the challenges faced in humanitarian supply chains, the ways that operations
research methodologies can be used to improve decisions, and the opportunities for




Disasters and public health challenges continue to have significant impact on the
lives and livelihoods of people worldwide. For example, in 2009 alone more than
119 million people were affected by disasters which caused over US$ 41.3 billion
in damages [99]. The same year, the international public health community faced
a global influenza pandemic. Thus far in 2010, we have witnessed a devastating
earthquake in Haiti, monumental flooding in Pakistan, and a host of other events
that, while perhaps less visible, are still challenging for the international community.
Preparedness for, response to, and mitigation of these humanitarian crises can be
improved using quantitative logistics methodologies. Although some of the earliest
applications of operations research and management science were in the public sector,
humanitarian supply chain and logistics problems have received much less attention
from the profession than their private sector counterparts. Many of these problems
require the discovery of novel approaches, because the constraints and objectives differ
from seemingly similar problems arising in the private sector. Solving these problems
advances our understanding of theory as well as practice.
In both private sector and humanitarian supply chains, decision makers face funda-
mental questions about facility location, transportation network design, forecasting,
inventory management, routing, scheduling, and allocation of resources to meet de-
mand for goods and services. Additional challenges that are particularly present in
humanitarian supply chains include high uncertainty in both supply and demand,
the need for a quick and dynamic response, limited or damaged infrastructure, and
a wide variety of agencies interacting while trying to pursue their own objectives.
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Together, these characteristics often lead to decentralized decision making. System
users are said to be decentralized because each individual or agency acts to optimize
his own objective, but these decisions impact other users and the performance of the
overall system. This is in contrast to the classical centralized optimization framework
in which a single decision maker determines the actions within the system based on
a global objective. Decentralization arises in humanitarian supply chains, for exam-
ple, when limited infrastructure prohibits system-wide communication, urgency takes
priority over time spent on coordination between decision makers, or decision makers
have differing objectives. The performance of a decentralized system can be much
worse than that of a system in which a central decision maker dictates choices, but
centralized control is unrealistic or very costly in many practical cases.
This thesis considers the design and analysis of humanitarian supply chains, by
which we mean those systems that deliver goods and services in response to natural
or man-made disasters as well as ongoing public health challenges. The contributions
of this thesis are threefold. First, we introduce a class of problems motivated by
humanitarian logistics systems with decentralized decision makers and characterize
theoretical properties of this class. Second, we demonstrate the applicability of the
framework developed in the first part using data from a large-scale response effort.
We illustrate how, when integrated with spatial statistics and geographic information
systems, these methods can help assess inequities in distribution efforts. Finally,
we adopt empirical methods to characterize a successful humanitarian supply chain
implemented by a private sector company and identify practices from which other
organizations can learn to improve their operations.
Both the first and second parts of the thesis are concerned with decentralized
decision making in humanitarian supply chains. The problems we study are motivated
by humanitarian response scenarios in which individuals choose, from a number of
distribution sites, the location that they will visit to obtain needed supplies. The
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contributions of the first part, described in Chapter 2, are as follows:
• We introduce the Facility-Specific Congestion Weights Problem (FSCWP), in
which individuals choose to visit one facility among a set of facilities opened
by a centralized planner. We consider individual objectives that include travel
time, congestion, and weights on congestion. Here, congestion depends on the
number of other individuals at the facility and weights are used to represent
the importance that individual decision makers place on congestion in their
objectives.
• We provide a polynomial time algorithm for finding an equilibrium solution,
or one from which no individual can deviate and improve her own solution,
regardless of the values of congestion weights.
• We provide new bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability (respectively,
worst- and best-case performance of the decentralized system in comparison to
a centralized one) for the FSCWP. We find that the bounds depend on the
congestion weight values allowed in the individuals’ objective functions.
• We introduce the concept of equilibrium-obtaining congestion weight vectors,
defined as those congestion values for which the centralized optimal solution is
also an equilibrium solution. We demonstrate that it is always possible to find
such a vector, and characterize the set of such vectors by examining what their
values can and must be. We find that any given component of the congestion
weight vector can be arbitrarily large and that the minimum value it must
assume corresponds to the objective value of a particular shortest path problem.
The method used to find a congestion weight vector for which the centralized
solution is an equilibrium can also be used to find such a vector for any chosen
solution.
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• We develop optimization models that can be solved efficiently to find equilibrium-
obtaining congestion weight vectors that optimize particular policy objectives.
The second part of the thesis describes the adaptation and application of ideas
from Chapter 2 to a large-scale effort to distribute a product in a limited amount of
time. The principle contributions of the second part are described in Chapter 3.
• We adapt the models from Chapter 2 to include facility capacity, defined as
the quantity of product available, in both the centralized and decentralized
objectives.
• We demonstrate that the methods introduced in Chapter 2 are applicable to
large-scale problems arising in practice. We solve the decentralized model with
approximately 80,000 communities of 100 people each and over 2,000 facilities
with total stock of more than 2,000,000 products and compare the results to
those of a centralized model of the same system.
• We quantify individuals’ access to the product as a function of distance, con-
gestion, and facility capacity and identify socioeconomic variables, including
income, racial/ethnic minority groups, population density, and availability of
service providers, that are associated with inequities in access.
• We integrate tools from geographic information systems (GIS), optimization,
game theory, and spatial statistics. This novel integration makes use of data
from many sources to explain the impact of past decisions about distribution
system design, which in turn can lead to improved decisions and policies in the
future.
The final part describes the hurricane response supply chain of Waffle House
Restaurants. Chapter 4 contains the following contributions:
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• We describe Waffle House Restaurants’ successful efforts to prepare for and re-
spond to hurricanes and the role of supply chain management principles, includ-
ing supply and demand management and inventory planning, in this process.
• We relate the company’s success to theoretical concepts from the literature on
crisis management, supply chain disruption, and humanitarian logistics.
• We provide lessons for other companies in the private sector as well as gov-
ernment and humanitarian agencies that wish to improve their readiness for
disasters or other supply chain disruptions.
• We use the information from this study to develop teaching materials that
emphasize the opportunities for improving decisions with operations research
methodologies and for cross-learning between public and private sector logis-
tics operations. These materials have been used in undergraduate, graduate,
and professional education settings with humanitarian practitioners as well as
business and engineering students.
Together, the contributions of this thesis advance the understanding of human-
itarian and public health logistics systems and provide insights for improving their
performance. This work also has implications for other systems where user choice
plays a role, including the health care sector and retail systems that distribute high-
demand, low-supply items such as popular novels or electronics. The integration of
spatial statistics, optimization, game theory, and GIS can lead to insights regarding
the design and assessment of many systems where equity is important, such as the
availability of housing, food retailers, or financial services. In Chapter 5, we describe
future research motivated by the thesis.
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CHAPTER II
INCORPORATING BEHAVIOR TO IMPROVE THE
PERFORMANCE OF DECENTRALIZED NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction
We consider networks characterized by decentralized decision making. Classical opti-
mization frameworks assume the existence of a centralized planner who determines all
the actions within the system to optimize a system-wide objective, but many examples
of decentralized systems exist in practice. In such systems, individuals make decisions
to optimize local objectives, but the choices of decentralized users impact the entire
system. Decentralized systems can perform poorly in comparison to their centralized
counterparts. However, centralization is often impractical or costly to implement.
In this chapter, we describe a class of decentralized network problems, quantify the
impact of decentralization, and develop ways to improve system performance.
In the decentralized problems we study, individuals choose to visit one of a number
of existing service facilities. The decentralized decision makers seek to minimize their
own costs of receiving service, but the centralized objective is to minimize the total
cost of providing service to all individuals, which is measured by the total travel time
and congestion experienced by all individuals. This problem arises in a number of
application areas in which service rates depend on individuals’ choices of routes or
service facilities, including networks of retail outlets or traffic networks. It is also
common in public health and humanitarian operations. For example, when agencies
open facilities to distribute goods or relief items in an emergency, residents choose the
facility they will visit to obtain needed items. A similar circumstance arises in the
allocation and use of medicine and supplies during an influenza pandemic. In many
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countries in Africa, individuals seeking antiretroviral treatments for HIV choose which
clinic to visit from among those dispensing treatments. The common element in each
of these and other decentralized network systems is that individuals make choices
based on their own objectives, but these choices impact others and the overall system
performance.
Modeling individual decision behavior is a key component of this research. When
individuals choose a facility to visit, travel time and congestion or wait time at the
facility are important components. The weight, or importance, placed on congestion
also plays a critical role in individuals’ evaluations of alternative facilities. In the
problems we consider, the congestion weights can differ across facilities. Individuals
may perceive regional health facilities differently than local clinics, for example, and
value their wait at each site differently. Differing levels of information may be avail-
able regarding facility status as a result of media or social communication tools, also
impacting the importance individuals place on congestion at the facilities. In this
chapter, we introduce the Facility-Specific Congestion Weights Problem to model de-
centralized objectives that include travel time, congestion, and facility-specific weights
on congestion arising in such scenarios.
In addition to introducing the decentralized problem from the individuals’ per-
spectives, we define a central planner’s problem to serve as a benchmark for the
decentralized system. The planner’s problem, as in traditional optimization, assumes
that a single entity controls all the actions within the system in a way that minimizes
total travel time and congestion. It is used as a basis for comparison to determine the
additional cost that is incurred when decisions within the system are made by decen-
tralized users rather than a single centralized planner. Converting to a centralized
system is not possible in many contexts, but understanding the centralized problem
can help in the design of better decentralized systems and mechanisms for improving
performance even in circumstances where central control is impractical.
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This research advances the understanding of decentralization in networks where
individuals choose among facilities to receive services and makes three primary con-
tributions. We first quantify the impact of decentralized decision making on system
performance and show that the objective individuals use when making decisions has
significant impact on network performance. Secondly, we demonstrate that systems
that are designed from a perspective that assumes centralized control are subject to
poor performance when they really operate in a decentralized way. However, our final
contribution is the introduction of approaches for mitigating this impact in systems
where centralization is not possible. To do so, we integrate tools from optimization
and game theory to develop mathematical models that capture individual decision
behavior and present algorithms for solving these models. We demonstrate that mech-
anisms that account for behavior can improve decentralized system performance. Ul-
timately, these results can be used to inform strategic and operational decisions made
by those who manage decentralized systems. They help answer such questions as how
to maximize the impact of scarce resources and how efficiently managing congestion
can improve decentralized system performance.
This chapter is organized as follows. Definitions and formal models are presented
in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 highlights the contributions of this research and summa-
rizes related literature. In Section 2.4, we introduce an efficient algorithm for finding
user equilibrium solutions. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 analyze the worst- and best-case
performance, respectively, of the user equilibrium solutions in the decentralized sys-
tem. We discuss ways to improve the cost of equilibrium solutions in Section 2.7 and
conclude in Section 2.8 with directions of current and future research.
2.2 Definitions and Models
The decentralized systems we study are related to congestion games and selfish rout-
ing problems that are explored in the disciplines of game theory, computer science,
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transportation engineering, and operations research. Here we introduce definitions
from these fields and present formal mathematical models of the problem we study.
2.2.1 Definitions
The following definitions are used in classifying decentralized systems. Unweighted
problems consider decentralized decision makers with identical demand, while those
with weighted users admit differing demands. In the nonatomic case, each user con-
trols an infinitesimal amount of flow which can be split over any number of paths in
the network; in this case, only the cumulative effect of customers has measurable im-
pact on the system. In contrast, in atomic problems the decisions of each individual
have a non-negligible effect on overall system performance. In the atomic case, there
are two scenarios: individuals’ demand may be splittable or unsplittable.
Important concepts in the study of decentralized systems are those of Nash equilib-
ria, price of anarchy, and price of stability. A Nash equilibrium is a solution in which
no customer can improve his selfish objective by unilaterally changing his strategy;
such solutions are said to be stable. However, equilibrium solutions can be more costly
than centralized optimal solutions, which are chosen to minimize total system-wide
cost. A measure called the price of anarchy is used to quantify the worst-case perfor-
mance degradation that results from lack of centralized control. First defined in [56]
and [74], it is the ratio of the total cost of the worst Nash equilibrium to the cost of
a centralized optimal solution. The price of stability is a similar ratio under the best
Nash equilibrium. In effect, the price of stability quantifies the minimum efficiency
loss a centralized planner will incur by proposing a stable solution from which no
decentralized decision maker will deviate. Throughout the chapter, when we refer to
the price of anarchy (stability) for a class of problems, we mean the maximum price
of anarchy (stability) among all problems in the class.
The decentralized systems we study fall into a class of problems called congestion
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games, first defined by Rosenthal [79], in which a set of self-interested players choose
from among a set of resources. The cost of using each resource is a non-decreasing
function of the number of players choosing the resource; it may be the same for all
users or it may be player-specific. The cost to an individual player of a given solution
is the sum of the costs of each of the resources she has chosen. Congestion games
in which all players have identical choices available to them are called symmetric
congestion games; those in which players’ choices differ are asymmetric. Network
congestion games are those in which the actions of the players can be represented as
paths in a network (N, E), with starting and ending nodes ai and bi for each player i.
Each player chooses a set of resources, represented by the edges in the network, such
that the resources chosen by i comprise a path in the network from ai to bi. The delay,
or latency, function on each edge is a non-decreasing function of the number of players
using the edge. Selfish routing problems, which have been studied in particular for
road networks and computer networks, are frequently modeled as network congestion
games.
2.2.2 The Model
The problem we study is modeled on a graph, G = (N, E). The node set, N , is
composed of three subsets: a set of user locations N indexed by i = A, B, . . . , n; a
set of facility locations M indexed by j = 1, 2, . . . ,m; and a dummy sink node t.
Edges in E are directed and belong to one of two subsets, Ef and Et. Arcs (i, j) ∈ Ef
represent travel from user locations to facility locations. Arcs (j, t) ∈ Et, also referred
to as sink arcs, connect each facility location j to t and represent service at facility
j. Costs on arcs in E represent costs experienced by users who traverse the arcs and
are non-decreasing functions of the number of users. We consider constant latencies
dij ≥ 0 on the travel time arcs (i, j) and linear latency functions xjt on the sink arcs
(j, t), where xjt is the total number of players using arc (j, t). The values used for
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these two cost components are converted into a common unit for use in the models.
The actions of the decentralized users are represented as paths in the network,
with the path for player i beginning at i ∈ N , visiting exactly one facility location
j ∈M, and ending at the sink t. A solution consists of one action for each player and
can be completely specified by binary variables xij for each i and j, where xij is 1 if
player i is served at facility j and 0 otherwise. Using this notation, the latency xjt
of each sink arc (j, t) is given by xjt =
∑n
i=1 xij. For simplicity, in the remainder of
the chapter we drop the t from the subscript because all sink arcs terminate at the
common sink.
The flow in the network is unweighted, unsplittable, and atomic. Flow is un-
weighted because each customer has identical demand, that is, must be served by
exactly one facility. The unsplittable characteristic indicates that each customer
must choose a single path. Atomic flow means that each customer’s decision has
a non-negligible effect on the overall system performance.
Using this modeling framework, we examine the problem of assigning customers
to facilities both from the perspectives of individual customers seeking to minimize
their own costs and of a centralized planner aiming to minimize the system-wide cost.
2.2.2.1 The Individual’s Problem
From the individual’s perspective, we consider a class of objective functions capturing
travel time, facility congestion, and weights related to congestion. We introduce the
Facility-Specific Congestion Weights Problem (FSCWP), which focuses on congestion
weights that are associated with facilities. This is modeled using a scalar, αj ≥ 0,
applied to the true congestion value at each facility j. The scalar is identical for all
individuals in the system. Each individual seeks to minimize his travel time plus
weighted congestion. An αj value of 1 indicates that the decentralized users value
congestion in their own objective functions at the same level that the centralized
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planner does in the system-wide objective. An αj value greater than 1 means that
decentralized decision makers place added weight on congestion experienced at facility
j in comparison to the centralized planner, while a value less than 1 means that less
weight is placed on congestion. If αj = 0, the congestion impact at facility j is not
included in individuals’ objective functions; facility j is evaluated based solely on the
travel time individuals experience in visiting it.
Given this framework, an equilibrium solution is one in which the following con-
dition holds for all individuals:










∀ k 6= j. (1)
Here, j is customer i’s facility in the solution being considered, while xpj = 1 if
customer p is served at facility j and 0 otherwise. The value αj is the congestion
weight associated with facility j.
In other words, when the full status of the system and the choices of each individual
are revealed, no individual has incentive to deviate from an equilibrium solution
because he cannot improve his objective by unilaterally changing his choice of facility.
This context gives rise to an asymmetric network congestion game. Finding equilibria
in general networks of this type is PLS -complete [33]. However, the problem is also
in the class of congestion games with player-specific latency functions studied by
Milchtaich [67], who showed that an equilibrium can be found efficiently using a
specialized algorithm to prevent cycling infinitely through non-equilibrium solutions.
As we will see, the structure of the FSCWP precludes this cycling behavior and admits
a more straightforward approach for finding an equilibrium than that described in [67].
2.2.2.2 The Planner’s Problem
In contrast to the preceding individuals’ problems in which many decision makers seek
to optimize selfish objectives, the planner’s problem assumes that a single centralized
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entity can allocate customers to facilities to minimize the total cost experienced by
the entire system. In our problem, the prices of anarchy and stability are measures of
the additional congestion and/or travel time incurred when customers choose based
on a selfish objective in comparison to the minimum cost that could be achieved by
assigning customers to facilities using a central authority. To determine the prices of
anarchy and stability, we develop a model for a centralized planner that serves as a
benchmark for the decentralized systems.

















xij = 1 ∀i (3)
xij ∈ B ∀i, j (4)
Despite the fact that individuals may make decisions based on facility-specific weights
on congestion, the centralized planner seeks to minimize the sum of actual travel and
waiting times incurred by all users, as shown in expression (2). Such an approach,
which employs a linear cost for each individual, is common in the framework of con-
gestion games. Moreover, while it is reasonable that individuals consider congestion
in some form, it is unlikely that they utilize queuing functions or other more com-
plicated expressions. The centralized objective function is thus chosen to maintain
similarity between the planner’s objective and the individual objectives. In the for-
mulation of the centralized planner’s problem, constraint (3) simply requires that
every individual be served at exactly one facility. The centralized problem is modeled
as a convex cost flow problem, and thus is polynomially solvable.
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2.3 Contributions and Related Literature
In what follows, we describe the contributions of this research and place it in the
context of related literature.
2.3.1 Contributions
This chapter presents fundamental contributions to the theory of managing systems
with decentralized decision makers. We introduce the Facility-Specific Congestion
Weights Problem (FSCWP), in which individuals choose to visit one facility among
a set of facilities opened by a centralized planner. We consider individual objectives
that include travel time, congestion, and weights on congestion. Travel time and
congestion are natural decision objectives on the part of individuals, but the inclusion
of facility-specific weights on congestion is novel and enables the representation of a
broader range of scenarios that are important in practice. We present new results
on the complexity of finding equilibrium solutions, bounds on the quality of these
solutions, and methods for improving decentralized performance in these systems.
The decentralized objective structure of the FSCWP gives rise to an asymmetric
network congestion game. Finding Nash equilibria in general instances of such games
is PLS-complete [33] and greedy algorithms can cycle infinitely even in cases where
equilibria can be found efficiently [67]. However, we prove that our problem admits a
polynomial time algorithm for finding an equilibrium solution, regardless of the values
of congestion weights. The proof of this result also implies that greedy approaches
cannot succumb to infinite cycles when applied to the FSCWP.
We provide new bounds on the price of anarchy for the FSCWP. The results are
classified by the congestion weight values allowed in the objective function. When
congestion weights are allowed to take on any values greater than 0, we show that
the price of anarchy can be arbitrarily high. In contrast, constant bounds have been
found for both atomic [8] and nonatomic [82] cases when congestion weights are not
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a component of the objective. When congestion weights are restricted to be greater
than or equal to the true facility congestion, we provide a tight lower bound on the
price of anarchy as well as an upper bound, each of which is a function of the greatest
weight. When the congestion weight associated with all facilities is equal to the true
congestion, we show that the price of anarchy is at least 2. This problem is a special
case of that considered in [8], which means that 2.5 is an upper bound on the price of
anarchy. Finally, when decentralized decision makers do not consider congestion but
instead make decisions based only on travel time, we prove that the price of anarchy
is O(m), where m is the number of facilities.
In addition to the price of anarchy, we also consider the price of stability for the
FSCWP. When individual objectives consider only travel time, the price of stability
is the same as the price of anarchy, O(m). We prove that the price of stability for a
given network is no greater when individuals consider travel time plus true congestion
than when they consider only travel time. We also illustrate that, for general values of
congestion weights, the price of stability can be worse than when congestions weights
are either all 0 (travel time only) or all 1 (travel time plus true congestion). These
results show that even the best equilibrium solutions can be costly, and they point to
the need for designing decentralized systems in ways that lead to better outcomes.
Having demonstrated that the decentralized systems in question can perform
poorly, we investigate ways to improve them. We first demonstrate that it is al-
ways possible to find a facility-specific congestion weight vector for which the cen-
tralized optimal solution is also an equilibrium solution. We refer to these weights
as equilibrium-obtaining and go on to characterize the set of such congestion weight
vectors by examining what their values can and must be. Finding a single equilibrium-
obtaining congestion weight vector is important, because it indicates that by changing
the importance that individual decision makers place on congestion we can improve
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the decentralized solution. However, we also investigate equilibrium-obtaining conges-
tion weight vectors that optimize particular policy objectives. For example, planners
may wish to improve the decentralized system in a way that distributes resources equi-
tably or that minimizes the investment needed for additional resources. To accomplish
these goals, we develop optimization models to find the equilibrium-obtaining con-
gestion weight vector that minimizes the range of weights across all facilities or that
minimizes the change from an initial congestion weight vector, respectively. We show
that solutions to these problems can be found efficiently using an algorithm for the
generalized circulation problem presented in [102]. Equilibrium-obtaining congestion
weights thus represent a mechanism for coordinating this class of decentralized logis-
tics systems. Since the assignment of demands to service providers is a component
of many several classes of logistics problems, such as facility location, the mechanism
we introduce can also inform the study of decentralized versions of these problems.
2.3.2 Related Literature
Previous work on decentralized systems has examined the existence of Nash equilib-
rium solutions, the computational complexity of finding them, and their quality in
comparison to centralized optimal solutions. In summarizing key results from the
literature on congestion games, we first turn our attention to the case of atomic, un-
splittable, and unweighted flow. This is the setting of the FSCWP. Rosenthal [79]
shows that every congestion game of this type, whether or not actions are represented
as paths in a network, has a pure Nash equilibrium (that is, each player chooses ex-
actly one strategy). This is in contrast to a mixed equilibrium, in which each player
employs a probability distribution over his set of feasible strategies. Researchers
examine the complexity of finding Nash equilibrium solutions from two angles: first,
determining whether any algorithm exists by which equilibria can be found efficiently
and second, determining whether a best-reply path can reach an equilibrium efficiently
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from an arbitrary starting point. In the latter approach, the sequence of solutions is
called a best-reply path because at each step, a single deviator switches to a strategy
that minimizes his cost with respect to the other players’ strategies – he switches to his
best reply. This can be characterized as a greedy, or myopic, algorithm. In the con-
text of congestion games with atomic, unsplittable, and unweighted flow, Fabrikant
et al. [33], show that finding Nash equilibria is PLS-complete except in the symmet-
ric case. Even when it is possible to find a Nash equilibrium efficiently, best-reply
paths can be cyclic [67], meaning that their length is unbounded and this approach
will not produce an equilibrium solution efficiently. [1] and [52] identify conditions
under which best-reply paths are polynomially bounded in length. Milchtaich [67]
shows that for player-specific linear latency functions, although infinite best-reply
paths may exist, there is always a path connecting an arbitrary initial point to an
equilibrium; the length of this path is polynomially bounded in the size of the strategy
space. The quality of equilibrium solutions is also an important question. Awerbuch
et al. [8], show that for linear latency functions that are identical for all users, un-
weighted and unsplittable demand, and pure strategies, the price of anarchy in a
network congestion game is 2.5. Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [18] prove analogous
results independently and also provide bounds for more general latency functions. In
a separate paper [17], the same authors provide lower and upper bounds on the price




Others [35, 36, 61, 25, 2] have studied congestion games in which individuals have
weighted, rather than identical, demand. In this case, a pure Nash equilibrium is no
longer guaranteed to exist. Researchers in this area establish conditions that ensure
the existence of pure equilibrium solutions, or in the absence of pure equilibria, study
mixed equilibrium solutions. The reader is referred to the survey by Kontogiannis
and Spirakis [55] and the references therein for additional results on the existence of
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pure Nash equilibria, the efficiency of constructing them, and prices of anarchy and
stability of atomic selfish routing in networks with both weighted and unweighted
users.
Much work has been done on the nonatomic case; see, for example, the survey by
Roughgarden [81] and the references therein. In the seminal paper by Roughgarden
and Tardos [82], they prove that the price of anarchy for nonatomic flow and linear
latencies is 4/3, while for general latency functions the value is unbounded. Correa et
al. [21], provide simplified proofs of the Roughgarden and Tardos results for networks
with separable cost functions. Additional work on nonatomic congestion games has
examined other types of cost functions [21, 22], uncertainty in cost parameters [72],
and fairness in individual user costs incurred in an equilibrium solution [22]. When
flow is atomic but splittable, Roughgarden [80] shows that the bounds on the price of
anarchy in the nonatomic case still hold when demand is unweighted. However, when
players have weighted demand, Cominetti et al. [20] prove upper and lower bounds
on the price of anarchy that are strictly higher than those in the nonatomic case.
In addition to developing bounds on decentralized system performance and deter-
mining the complexity of finding equilibrium solutions, researchers have investigated
how to design systems to reduce the negative impact of decentralized decision making.
Roughgarden’s survey [81] highlights three of these in the nonatomic case: increasing
network capacity, routing part of the traffic centrally, and imposing taxes on links.
Anshelevich et al. [5], study the design of a network in which users share the link
construction costs. They are among the first to define the price of stability, and they
provide a bound on its value for this network design game. Roughgarden and Tardos
[83] seek games for which the decentralized solution is approximately optimal, while
Chen et al. [16], design cost-sharing protocols to minimize the prices of anarchy and
stability. Paz and Peeta [75] provide information to drivers in a traffic network to
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influence behavior toward route choices that more closely approximate the system-
optimal solution. Although their model is not within the congestion game framework,
their results describe an approach for improving decentralized systems by accounting
for individual behavior.
We conclude the literature summary by briefly examining related work in the
area of transportation and logistics network management, which is the motivating
application domain for our research. The assignment of demands to facilities or service
providers is a component of many logistics problems, especially in the area of facility
location. The reader is referred to [24] and [27], as well as the work cited therein,
for thorough reviews of discrete network location models and location problems in
transportation, respectively. In these models, either a centralized planner determines
the assignment of demands to facilities or, if individuals choose, distance is their
principal criterion. A notable exception is the work of [7], in which a firm’s facility
location decisions are made under the assumption that customers will choose a facility
based on service price and transportation cost, both of which are functions of the
location and the number of other customers choosing the facility. Revelle et al.
[78] provide a recent review of facility location models in which they cite the need
for additional work that incorporates congestion and explicitly models customers’
demands within the system.
Decision making by decentralized, collaborative agents has been modeled in several
transportation and logistics application areas. The objective of much of this research
is the development of mechanisms that facilitate cooperation toward an end that
is beneficial for all parties but that still optimizes the individual agents’ objectives.
Examples include alliances in passenger air [98, 105], air cargo [48], sea cargo [4,
14], and truckload transportation [73] industries; the management of air traffic flow
[100, 63]; cooperative facility location [39]; retail transshipment coordination [42]; and
general multi-commodity flow frameworks [3, 41].
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2.4 Complexity of Finding an Equilibrium
In this section, we explore the complexity of identifying equilibrium solutions to
FSCWP. Recall that such equilibria exist [79], but finding one can be challenging
in general network congestion games [33, 67]. The structure of the network for the
FSCWP, however, admits a straightforward polynomial time algorithm for finding a
Nash equilibrium solution. Before proceeding with the proof for the general case, we
formalize an observation for the case in which individuals consider only travel time
in their objectives.
Remark 1 When αj = 0 for all j, that is, when decentralized decision makers con-
sider only travel time, finding an equilibrium solution is trivial. Each individual simply
visits the closest facility.
We now present the result for more general α vectors.
Theorem 1 A pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the FSCWP can be found in poly-
nomial time.
Proof. The proof consists of three parts. We first present a transformation of the
original network to a minimum cost flow problem on a related network. Then we
show that all combinations of customer choices can be represented as feasible flows
in the transformed network. Finally, we prove that the minimum cost flow on this
network represents a solution that is the global minimizer of a particular potential
function, and thus a Nash equilibrium.
We first present the network transformation, which is illustrated in Figure 1 for
a small example network. Recall the network depiction of the original problem, with
arcs (i, j) from each customer i to each facility j and corresponding costs dij. Arcs
(j, t) from each facility j to the sink t have cost xj, where xj is the total number of













































































Figure 1: Original, Perceived, and Minimum Cost Flow Networks.
facility node j has 0 supply, and the sink node t has net demand of n units, where n is
the total number of customers.. The central optimal solution to the FSCWP problem
corresponds to a minimum cost flow in this network. In Figure 1, the original network
is pictured on the left. The network for the decentralized decision makers is identical,
with the exception that the perceived cost on arc (j, t) from each facility j to the
sink t is αjxj. The perceived network is shown in the center of Figure 1. Given this
structure, we create a related network as follows. First, replace each sink arc (j, t)
with n copies of the arc, each with capacity 1. The costs cjk,t on duplicate arcs
(j1, t), (j2, t), . . . , (jn, t) are cjk,t = k · αjk for all j = 1, . . . ,m and k = 1, . . . , n. All
other arcs remain the same and have the same costs as the original network, and the
supplies at each node are identical to those in the original network. The result of this
transformation is depicted on the right of Figure 1. The transformation takes O(mn)
effort.
We now prove that an assignment of customers to facilities is feasible if and
only if it corresponds to a feasible flow in the transformed network. Suppose we
have a feasible assignment of customers to facilities; that is, each customer is served
at exactly one facility. By the construction of the transformed network, we can
represent this assignment as the composite of n unit flows, one from each customer
to the facility and then to the sink. This composite flow clearly satisfies flow balance
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constraints, and since there are n arcs from each facility to the sink we satisfy flow
bound constraints as well. Therefore, the assignment can be represented as a feasible
flow in the transformed network. Now suppose that f is a feasible integer flow in the
transformed network. This implies that 1 unit is supplied from each customer and
that n units terminate at the sink without violating flow bounds. We need only look
at the flow on arcs (i, j) and assign customer i to the facility j for which the flow from
i to j is 1. Thus all customers are assigned to exactly one facility, and the feasible
flow corresponds to a feasible assignment of customers to facilities.
Finally, we employ a potential function argument similar to that presented in [79]
to show that the minimum cost flow in the transformed network represents a Nash
equilibrium for the original problem. For a particular solution s, let xsij be the binary
variable indicating whether i is served at j, xsj is the total number of individuals
served at facility j, and αj is the congestion weight associated with facility j. The














(Note that y in this expression just serves as the index of summation, so that the
right-most term in the potential function is αj · (0 + 1 + . . . + xsj) for each j.) Clearly,
the cost of a feasible flow s in the transformed network is given by φ(s). Suppose the
change from solution s to s′ involves a move by a single individual i from facility j
to facility k and that the move improves i’s objective function. The change in i’s






























= (dij + αjx
s
j)− (dik + αkxs
′
k ) = costi(s)− costi(s′).
Since the move from s to s′ improves i’s objective function, costi(s) > costi(s
′). The
potential function decreases by the same amount as does player i’s objective function
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as a result of the move. Thus, every improving move on the part of an individual
results in an equal decrease in the potential function value. Rosenthal [79] proved
that any potential function local minima corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. By
solving the minimum cost flow problem on the transformed network, we obtain a
global minima of the function, which is well-defined since the potential function is
non-negative. Because the global minima is certainly a local minima, and because we
have shown that a feasible flow corresponds to a feasible assignment of customers to
facilities, the solution to the minimum cost flow problem is a Nash equilibrium of the
original problem.
The network transformation is polynomial and the minimum cost flow problem
can be solved in polynomial time, implying that a Nash equilibrium for the FSCWP
can be found in polynomial time. 2
This algorithm extends the results of [33] by showing that an equilibrium for this
particular asymmetric congestion game can also be found in polynomial time using
minimum cost flow techniques. Previously, this had only been proven for symmetric
networks. This is a more straightforward algorithm than that presented in [67] for
general player-specific linear latency functions, which is possible due to additional
latency function structure in this problem. The existence of a potential function also
implies the next result.
Corollary 1 Infinite best-reply paths cannot occur in the FSCWP.
Proof. Monderer and Shapley [68] proved that the existence of a potential function
implies the finite improvement property, meaning that infinite best-reply paths cannot
occur. 2
In Chapter 3, we describe our analysis of a recent emergency response scenario,
in which we implement this algorithm using data from a large-scale network with
individual decision makers.
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2.5 Price of Anarchy
In this section, we present bounds on the price of anarchy under several different
congestion weight scenarios. Recall that the price of anarchy is the ratio of the costs of
the worst equilibrium solution and the central optimal solution. Quantifying this value
is an important task in designing and managing decentralized systems. Ultimately,
system planners seek ways to minimize the impact of decentralized decision making
by reducing the price of anarchy. Here, we consider four cases distinguished by their
congestion weight values. The first and most general case is that in which αj can
take on any value greater than 0 for a given facility j. In the second case, we restrict
αj to be at least 1 for every facility, that is, congestion is at least as important to
individuals as travel time. Thirdly, we present results for systems in which αj = 1
for all j. This scenario is one in which decentralized decision makers place the same
weight on congestion at the facilities that the system planner does; in essence, they
perceive the true congestion. Finally, we examine the case in which αj = 0 for all j.
Here, individuals choose facilities on the basis of travel time alone and do not consider
congestion at any facility. The reader is referred to Appendix B.2 for the description
of an approach we developed to study the price of anarchy computationally.
2.5.1 Case 1: Congestion Weights Greater than 0
We begin with the case in which αj > 0 for all j. In this broad scenario, the decen-
tralized system can perform quite poorly in comparison to a centralized system.






where αmax and αmin denote the maximum and minimum αj values in the system,
respectively.





customers and m = n + 1
facilities. Distances between customer i and facilities 1, . . . , n are di,1 = di,2 = . . . =
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di,n = 0 for all i, while that to facility n+1 is di,n+1 = αmax−nαmin for all customers i.
Similarly, the facility congestion weights are α1 = α2 = . . . = αn = αmax while αn+1 =
αmin. The highest-cost equilibrium solution has all customers at facility n+1, with the
perceived cost to each customer given by the sum of his distance, αmax− nαmin, plus
his weighted congestion, nαmin, which is equal to αmax. This is an equilibrium solution
because the perceived cost of switching to another facility is also αmax. However, the
true cost of this solution is n(αmax − nαmin + n). The optimal solution serves one
customer at each of the first n facilities, incurring a total cost of n. Therefore, we
have
Price of Anarchy(α > 0) =
n(αmax − nαmin + n)
n






where the inequality follows from the fact that αmax − nαmin ≥ 0 by the choice of n.
2
As a consequence of Theorem 2, it is possible to construct decentralized systems
with arbitrarily large prices of anarchy by making the ratio between αmax and αmin
suitably large. The intuition behind this observation is that large discrepancies in
the weights associated with congestion at different facilities can lead to decentralized
choices that drastically increase system-wide costs. However, by examining more
restricted ranges for α values, we hope to obtain better bounds on the price of anarchy.
2.5.2 Case 2: Congestion Weights Greater than or Equal to 1
We next examine the case in which αj ≥ 1 for all j. In these systems, decentralized
decision makers perceive at least the true congestion value, although they may assign
greater weight congestion. In this scenario, we are able to provide both upper and
lower bounds on the price of anarchy.
Theorem 3 The price of anarchy in systems with αj ≥ 1 for all j satisfies






Total Cost = n
A Nash Equilibrium; 








Figure 2: Lower Bound on Price of Anarchy when αj ≥ 1 for all j.
where αmax denotes the maximum α value in the system.
Proof Sketch. The full proof is provided in Appendix A and consists of two parts.
We first demonstrate the lower bound by providing a network structure, illustrated
in Figure 2, for which the lower bound is tight for any value of αmax ≥ 1 and for
any number of customers, n, and facilities, m. We then prove the upper bound by
establishing relationships between equilibrium costs to individuals, system-wide cost
of equilibrium solutions, and central optimal solution cost.
2.5.3 Case 3: Congestion Weights Equal to 1
Systems in which αj = 1 for all j constitute of a subset of those considered in
Case 2. In this setting, individuals place the same importance on congestion at each
facility as does the centralized planner. The results from Section 2.5.2 have immediate
implications for this scenario.
Corollary 2 If αj = 1 for all facilities j, then the price of anarchy satisfies
2 ≤ Price of Anarchy ≤ 2.5.
Proof. The result follows from substituting αmax = 1 into the result from Theorem
3. 2
There are a number of network structures for which we have proven that the









Figure 3: Price of Anarchy Can Be Worse When αj = 1 than When αj = 0 for all j.
B.1.1. We further conjecture that this is the worst-case bound on the performance
of decentralized systems for general network structures when all the α’s are 1. The
proof of this conjecture remains a component of our ongoing research.
It may seem that decentralized performance should be better in systems in which
individual and system-wide objectives perceive congestion in the same way than in
systems where individuals assign other weights to congestion. However, we find that
this is not always the case.
Remark 2 There are networks for which the price of anarchy is greater when indi-
viduals choose based on travel time and true congestion than when they choose based
solely on travel time.
Proof. Consider the family of networks represented by Figure 3 with αmax = 1 and
the same networks with αmax = 0.
When αmax = 1, (that is, individuals choose based on travel time and true con-
gestion), the price of anarchy is 2, because it is an equilibrium when both individuals
choose their more distant facility. However, when αmax = 0, the only equilibrium
solution is the optimal solution, where both individuals visit their closest facility,
and the price of anarchy is 1. This structure can be replicated for any number of
customers n and facilities m, where n = m. 2
This result demonstrates that even when decentralized decision makers incorpo-
rate both travel time and true congestion in their objectives, this does not always
result in lower system-wide costs than a simpler objective that considers only travel
time.
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2.5.4 Case 4: Congestion Weights Equal to 0
In this section, we quantify the performance of decentralized systems in which indi-
viduals seek to minimize their own travel time. The congestion weight αj associated
with each facility j is 0. Here, individuals either do not know the system status and
choices of other customers or they do not incorporate this information into their deci-
sion making. Before presenting price of anarchy results for this scenario, we formalize
some observations that will be useful in the subsequent discussion.
Remark 3 Let Dd be the total travel time incurred by all customers in a decentralized
solution in which customers choose based only on travel time and Dc be the total travel
time in a centralized optimal solution. Then Dc ≥ Dd.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that the total travel time in the centralized op-
timal solution is less than that in a decentralized solution. Then there must be at
least one customer who experiences a shorter travel time. However, since customers
choose on nominal travel time, this customer would have chosen the facility with
shorter travel time in the decentralized solution. 2
Remark 4 Let Cd be the total system congestion in a decentralized solution in which
customers choose on nominal travel time and Cc be the total system congestion in a
centralized optimal solution. Then Cc ≤ Cd.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that Cc > Cd. The total cost of the decentralized
solution is Dd + Cd and that of the centralized optimal solution is Dc + Cc. By
Lemma 3, Dc ≥ Dd. But then Dc + Cc > Dd + Cd, contradicting the optimality of
the centralized solution. 2
Given the preceding observations, we are equipped to bound the price of anarchy
in the case in which individuals choose solely on travel time.
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Theorem 4 The price of anarchy for general networks in which αj = 0 for all j is
O(m).
Proof. We begin by providing an upper bound for the cost of the equilibrium solution
and a lower bound for that of the centralized optimal solution. We know that in the
case in which all αj’s are 0, the total travel time in an equilibrium solution is equal
to the sum over all the customers of the travel time from each customer to his closest
facility. We again represent this value as Dd. The worst congestion in any possible
scenario is n2, which occurs when all customers choose the same facility. We thus
obtain the following upper bound on the cost of a decentralized solution:
Total Cost of Equilibrium Solution ≤ Dd + n2.
This upper bound is tight for networks in which all individuals choose the same facility
in an equilibrium solution.
To obtain a lower bound on the centralized cost, observe that the minimum pos-
sible congestion in any network occurs when individuals are split equally among fa-
cilities, resulting in a total congestion of 1
m
n2. Letting Dc represent the total travel
time in the centralized solution and invoking Lemma 3, we have a lower bound on
the cost of the centralized solution:
Total Cost of Centralized Solution ≥ Dc +
1
m




Note that this bound is tight in networks for which the centralized optimal solution
is to split customers equally between facilities but for which Dc = Dd. That is, the
centralized solution achieves the minimum congestion without incurring additional
travel time beyond that experienced in the equilibrium solution in which individuals
choose their closest facility.
Combining these two bounds, we have:
Price of Anarchy(α = 0) =
Total Cost of Worst Equilibrium
Total Cost of Centralized Solution
























Figure 4: Price of Anarchy when α = 0.
Therefore, the Price of Anarchy(α = 0) ≤ O(m).
To see that the result is tight, consider the network in Figure 4. Each customer’s
travel time to Facility 1 is d units, while the time to reach Facilities 2, . . . ,m is d + ε
units. An equilibrium solution is one in which all customers visit Facility 1. As ε goes
to 0, the central optimal solution is to split the customers equally among all facilities.
For any values of m and n, we obtain
Price of Anarchy(α = 0) =
nd + n2




Another way to view this result is that when ε = 0, the network in Figure 4
simultaneously satisfies the cases for which the upper and lower bounds presented in
the proof are tight.
We document additional results concerning special cases of the FSCWP when
αj = 0 for all j in Appendix B.1.2.
In this section, we have quantified the performance of the worst equilibrium solu-
tions under several different congestion weight scenarios. Although this performance
can be bad, we also seek to understand whether there are alternative equilibrium
solutions that perform better.
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2.6 Price of Stability
Recall that the price of stability is the ratio of the costs of the best equilibrium
solution and the central optimal solution. Here we examine the price of stability
under different congestion weight scenarios, in particular comparing this value across
the scenarios.
2.6.1 Price of Stability: Congestion Weights Equal to 0
We begin with the scenario in which αj = 0 for all j because results for other scenarios
are built upon it. In Section 2.5.4 we presented the price of anarchy results for
this case. The network in Figure 4, for which the price of anarchy result is tight,
immediately implies the following result for the price of stability.
Theorem 5 The price of stability in the case in which αj = 0 for all j is at most
O(m).
Proof. Recall that the price of stability is the ratio of the cost of the best equilibrium
solution to that of a centrally optimal solution. In the network in Figure 4, for any
ε > 0, the single equilibrium solution is the one in which all customers choose Facility
1. We have seen that the ratio of the cost of this equilibrium to that of the centrally
optimal solution is O(m). The ratio can clearly be no greater, because from the proof
of Theorem 4 we have that O(m) is an upper bound on the ratio of the costs of the
equilibrium and centrally optimal solutions. 2
2.6.2 Price of Stability: Congestion Weights Equal to 1
In this section, we examine the scenario in which αj = 1 for all j. Recall that [17]
provide nearly equal lower and upper bounds on the price of stability for this case,
namely that the value is between 1+
√
3/3 (about 1.577) and 1.6. In contrast to our
results for the case in which αj = 0 for all j, the best equilibrium solutions can thus
be quite good. This illustrates that the weight associated with facility congestion
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can significantly influence decentralized system outcomes. As Corollary 2 establishes,
there are networks in which the α = 1 congestion weight framework can result in more
costly solutions than the framework in which αj’s are 0 and individuals consider only
travel time. Despite this fact, we prove that the best equilibrium under the α = 1
framework has cost no greater than the best equilibrium under the α = 0 framework.
Before presenting the proof, we state two preliminary lemmas. The proofs of the
lemmas are included in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 Let x be a solution in which customer i is served at facility j and let xj be
the total number of customers at j excluding i. Similarly, let xk be the total number
of customers at k. Then the net effect on the total system cost of moving customer i
from facility j to facility k is 2xk − 2xj + dik − dij.
Lemma 2 Given any customer i and any solution that satisfies i’s Equilibrium Con-
dition (Definition 1) under α = 0 but not under α = 1, then the single change in which
customer i is moved to a facility that satisfies the latter condition strictly decreases
the system-wide cost.
We are now equipped to present the theorem that relates the costs of the best
equilibria under the scenarios in which congestion weights are 0 and 1, respectively.
Theorem 6 For α = 0, let x∗(α = 0) be the solution with lowest total cost in which
the Equilibrium Condition is satisfied for all customers; for α = 1, let x∗(α = 1) be
the solution with lowest total cost in which the Equilibrium Condition is satisfied for
all customers; and let z∗(α = 0) and z∗(α = 1) be their corresponding system cost
values. Then z∗(α = 1) ≤ z∗(α = 0).
Proof Sketch. The full proof is presented in Appendix A. For clarity of exposition,
we present only the main ideas here. The proof consists of two parts. First, we begin
at an arbitrary equilibrium solution under the α = 0 framework and move customers
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one by one (possibly moving a customer more than once) such that the current move
satisfies that customer’s Equilibrium Condition under the α = 1 framework. We show
that the cumulative change in system cost that results from these moves is strictly
negative using the results from Lemmas 1 and 2. Second, we show that this iterative
process reaches an equilibrium solution under the α = 1 framework in a pseudo-
polynomial number of steps under the assumption that travel times and α values are
rational numbers. 2
Observe that the constructive proof of this result also provides an algorithm for
constructing an equilibrium solution under the α = 1 framework given any equilibrium
under the α = 0 framework, the latter of which is easy to find as per Remark 1. The
result also implies the following corollaries.
Corollary 3 The price of stability in any network in the scenario in which αj = 1
for all j is no greater than that in the same network in the scenario in which αj = 0
for all j .
Proof. The price of stability is defined as follows:
Price of Stability(α = 0) =
z∗(α = 0)
z∗
Price of Stability(α = 1) =
z∗(α = 1)
z∗
Here, z∗ is the total system cost of the central optimal solution. From Theorem 6 we







Corollary 4 Let D∗(α = 0) and C∗(α = 0) be the total travel time and total conges-
tion in the best equilibrium solution when αj = 0 for all j, respectively. Let D
∗(α = 1)
and C∗(α = 1) be the total travel time and total congestion in the best equilibrium
solution when αj = 1 for all j, respectively. Then D
∗(α = 1) ≥ D∗(α = 0) and















Figure 5: Price of Stability for α ≥ 0.
Proof. Clearly D∗(α = 1) ≥ D∗(α = 0) holds since D∗(α = 0) is achieved when each
customer chooses a facility with minimum travel time. Then C∗(α = 1) ≤ C∗(α = 0)
follows from the travel time relationship and the result of Theorem 6. 2
We have thus characterized relationships between equilibrium solutions found by
decentralized users under different selfish objectives. We have also seen that although
the price of stability is no greater in the scenario in which αj = 1 for all j than when
αj = 0 for all j, the former can still lead to poor performance.
2.6.3 Price of Stability: Congestion Weights Greater than or Equal to 0
Unfortunately, simple networks confirm that the price of stability under general con-
gestion weight values can be worse than both of the more restricted frameworks, that
is, when αj = 0 or when αj = 1 for all j.
Lemma 3 The price of stability for a given network in systems with congestion
weights αj ≥ 0 for all j can be worse than that in the same network when αj = 0 for
all j or when αj = 1 for all j.
Proof. Consider the simple network in Figure 5. The distance from Customer A to
Facility 1 is 0, while that to Facility 2 is d > 0. The central optimal solution sends
the single customer to Facility 1, incurring a total cost of 1. This is also the only
equilibrium solution for the case with α1 = α2 = 0 and for the case with α1 = α2 = 1.
However, for any values of α1 = αmax and α2 = αmin such that αmin + d < αmax, the
only equilibrium solution sends Customer A to Facility 2, resulting in a total cost of
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d + 1. The price of stability in this case is also d + 1. 2
Looking at the network in Figure 5 another way, for any αmax and αmin greater
than or equal to 0, it is possible to construct a network with price of stability arbitrar-
ily close to αmax−αmin +1. As we have also seen with the price of anarchy, when the
congestion weights of different facilities vary, the decentralized system performance
worsens. These results illustrate that even the best equilibrium solutions can be very
costly in comparison to optimal decisions made by a central planner. Since central-
ized decision making is not possible in the settings we consider, alternative methods
for improving decentralized decision making are needed.
2.7 Improving Equilibrium Performance
To combat the poor performance described in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, we introduce a
way to improve the quality of decentralized equilibrium solutions by influencing the
congestion weights associated with facilities. In practice, this may be accomplished
by providing information to decentralized decision makers regarding true conges-
tion, changing system processes, or improving waiting time experiences. Congestion
weights are now variables to optimized, rather than fixed parameters, and changing
congestion weights is a mechanism by which to improve system outcomes. In this
section, we begin by establishing the existence of equilibrium-obtaining congestion
weights. These are congestion weights under which the central optimal solution is
also an equilibrium for decentralized decision makers. We characterize the set of such
congestion weights and introduce models to identify equilibrium-obtaining α values
that optimize policy objectives.
2.7.1 Existence of Equilibrium-obtaining Congestion Weights
The assignment of customers to facilities that optimizes the centralized system ob-
jective is computationally easy to identify, but it is not often an equilibrium solution
given the current congestion weights associated with the facilities. Given a network,
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is there a congestion weight vector α for which the central optimal solution is also an
equilibrium? To answer this question, we introduce a feasibility problem, P, defined
as follows:
(P ) = Maximize 0
x∗jαj − (x∗k + 1)αk ≤ dik − dij ∀ j, i ∈ I∗(j), k 6= j
αj ≥ 0 ∀ j
Here, I∗(j) is the set of individuals served at facility j in the central optimal
solution and x∗j = |I∗(j)|. The objective function is 0 because we are concerned
only with finding a feasible α at this point. The constraints require that, for every
individual i served at j in the central optimal solution, i’s Equilibrium Condition
1 is satisfied with respect to every other facility in the network. The system has a
total of n(m− 1) constraints, where n is the number of customers and m the number
of facilities. Observe, however, that some of the constraints in this system may be
redundant. For each facility pair (k, j), there is a constraint for every individual
served at j. Among these, the constraint with the smallest right-hand side value,
denoted Dkj = mini{dik − dij}, dominates the others. Based on this observation, we
can simplify the feasibility problem by eliminating dominated constraints, resulting
in problem P ′:
(P ′) = Maximize 0
x∗jαj − (x∗k + 1)αk ≤ Dkj ∀ j, k 6= j
αj ≥ 0 ∀ j
The reduced system has at most m(m−1) constraints. If it has a feasible solution,
this means that there exists an α vector under which the central optimal solution is
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also an equilibrium – an equilibrium-obtaining α. We will show that such a vector
always exists, and since the proof relies on duality theory we first present D′, the dual
of P ′. Let ykj be the dual variable associated with the primal constraint x
∗
jαj − (x∗k +










ykj − (x∗j + 1)
∑
k
yjk ≥ 0 ∀ j (6)
ykj ≥ 0 ∀ k, j (7)
P ′ has a feasible solution if D′ is both feasible and bounded. We now prove that this
is the case.
Theorem 7 P ′ always has a feasible solution α, thus there exists at least one feasible
equilibrium-obtaining congestion weight vector.
We provide the full proof of this result in Appendix A. Clearly the vector ykj = 0
for all k, j is a feasible solution to D′, and we demonstrate that this is a unique
solution.
The result ensures the existence of a feasible α vector. Furthermore, the structure
of the problem admits efficient approaches for identifying such a vector. The primal
problem is a linear program with two variables per inequality (TVPI). Polynomial
algorithms for identifying feasible solutions to TVPI linear programs were presented
by [19] and [46]. In the next section, we characterize properties of the feasible region
for the problem.
2.7.2 Characterizing the Set of Equilibrium-obtaining α Values
To further understand the properties of the equilibrium-obtaining congestion weight
vectors, we now examine the set of equilibrium-obtaining α’s by characterizing the
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maximum and minimum values that components of the vector can assume. This is
relevant in practice because it answers questions such as how great the congestion
weights can be and how great they must be while still achieving an equilibrium
solution that is optimal. This analysis is facilitated by more generic primal and
dual models than those presented in the previous discussion. In what follows, we
demonstrate that theoretical properties of these models lead to bounds on the values
of equilibrium-obtaining α vectors. These bounds quantify the trade-offs between
travel time and congestion necessary to induce an equilibrium solution.
We begin by introducing primal problem P̄ and its dual D̄. The constraints of
P̄ are the same as those of problem P ′, but the objective function is now a generic
linear function of α.




x∗jαj − (x∗k + 1)αk ≤ Dkj ∀ j, k 6= j (9)

















ykj ≥ 0 ∀ k, j (13)
The values of objective function coefficients bj will depend on what we seek to un-
derstand about the feasible region of P̄ . This formulation allows us to examine, for
example, the maximum or minimum values that each component αj can assume.
The dual problem D̄, as stated, is a generalized minimum cost flow problem. This
problem is similar to the familiar minimum cost flow problem, except flow conserva-
tion on arcs is no longer required. Arcs lose or gain flow according to gain factors,
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λ. (This framework has been used for modeling currency exchange or the transport
of liquid commodities in leaky vessels.) The generalized minimum cost flow problem
is also equivalent to a generalized minimum cost circulation problem. Examining the
generalized circulation problem formulation leads to important insights about the set
of equilibrium-obtaining α values.
To transform D̄ into the equivalent generalized circulation problem, we introduce
dummy source and sink nodes, S and T , as well as dummy arcs (S, j) and (j, T ) for
each original node j, (T, S) to connect the sink to the source, and a self-loop (S, S).
Each dummy arc has a cost of 0 and an associated gain factor of 1, with the exception













yjk + ySj − yjT = 0 ∀ j (15)
yTS + λSSySS −
∑
j
ySj − yS,S = 0 (16)
∑
j
yjT − yT,S = 0 (17)
ykj ≥ 0 ∀ k, j (18)




0 ≤ ySj ≤
bj
x∗j + 1
for {j | bj
x∗j + 1
< 0} (20)








for {j | bj
x∗j + 1
> 0} (22)
In the generalized circulation problem, supplies and demands are no longer associ-
ated with the nodes. All flow is endogenous and circulates within the network, so the
flow balance at each node is 0 as represented in constraints (15)-(17). The transfor-
mation from the original generalized minimum cost flow problem to the generalized
minimum cost circulation problem replaces node supplies from the original dual con-
straints (12) with flow bounds on appropriate arcs, given by constraints (19)-(22).
We use this transformed dual problem to establish several characteristics of the
feasible region of equilibrium-obtaining α values in problem P ′. First, we demonstrate
that equilibrium-obtaining α values can be infinitely large.
Theorem 8 If all non-zero primal objective function coefficients bj are positive, the
primal problem is unbounded.
Proof. Let J+ be the set of facilities for which the primal objective function coef-
ficients bj are non-zero. From the statement of the theorem, bj > 0 for all j ∈ J+.
Then ySj = 0 for all j to satisfy the constraint set (19). However, we must also have
yjT ≥ bjx∗j +1 > 0 for all j ∈ J
+. This is a contradiction, because it is impossible to have
flow exiting the original network at the sink T without flow entering at the source S.
The dual problem is thus infeasible. Since the primal problem always has a feasible
solution (Theorem 7), the primal problem is unbounded. 2
We have seen that equilibrium-obtaining α values can be infinitely large. How
large must they be? That is, what is the minimum importance that decentralized
decision makers must place on congestion for a particular facility to ensure that
the central optimal solution is an equilibrium? Suppose we want find the minimum
value that αj can take on for some facility j. That is, the primal objective is to
maximize −αj. Duality theory ensures that we can determine the minimum value
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Example Network – Dual Problem
Figure 6: Example Dual Network for Generalized Circulation.
network. However, we prove that there is a simpler way to find the solution. Figure 6
illustrates the dual network for a case in which we seek to minimize α1 in a problem
with three facilities.
Theorem 9 The minimum feasible value of αj for any j can be found by solving a
single generalized shortest path problem in the dual network.
Proof. First, we show that it suffices to consider S-T flow rather than the entire
circulation. This is evident because the costs of the (T,S) dummy arc and (S,S)
dummy loop are each 0 and the (S,S) dummy loop is constructed only to restore flow
balance, if needed, in the original circulation problem. Therefore, flow on these arcs
is completely dictated by the flow between S and T and will not affect the value of
the minimum cost circulation.
Next, we must show that a min cost S-T flow can be achieved using a single simple











where (k, j) ∈ p are the arcs in path p, l ≤ k indicates nodes l appearing in p prior
to and including k, Dkj is the cost of arc (k, j), and λl is the loss factor associated
with arcs entering node l.
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Now, if Cp ≥ 0 for all p that contain at least one original network arc, then clearly
a minimum cost flow is given by the 0 flow or by an S-1-T-S flow, either of which has
value 0, so there is nothing to show in this case.
If at least one Cp < 0, then the minimum cost flow can be found by successively
saturating the remaining path with the most negative cost. However, since all paths
share the common arc (S,1) with upper bound 1
x∗1+1
, and no other arcs have upper
bounds, only the path with most negative cost will be selected. The value of the flow
is then given by 1
x∗1+1
· Cpmin , where pmin is the path with most negative cost.
Since the value of the primal optimal solution is equal to the that of the dual
optimal solution, and we have just shown that the dual optimal value can be obtained
by finding the S-T path with the most negative cost, we can determine the minimum
value of α1 by solving the minimum cost S-T path problem, as proposed. 2
Solving the shortest path problem will therefore answer the question about the
minimum congestion weight that decentralized decision makers must place on a par-
ticular facility. This approach also lends itself to the development of bounds on the
values of individual αj components. To facilitate further characterization of these
bounds, we introduce a technical lemma; the proof is presented in Appendix A.
Lemma 4 Although negative cycles consisting exclusively of original nodes and arcs
in the dual network may exist when flow loss factors are included, such a negative
cycle is not included in any most-negative S − T path in the dual network.
This result provides information about the structure of this class of generalized
minimum cost circulation problems. In our case, it will be used to establish bounds
characterizing the minimum value that each component of α can assume, or in other
words, the minimum level of importance that decentralized decision makers must
place on facility congestion for the central optimal solution to be an equilibrium.
Bounding the smallest equilibrium-obtaining values of congestion weights provides
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insights for managing decentralized systems by identifying trade-offs between travel
time and congestion even without solving the shortest path problem for each value of
αj. This can point to opportunities to provide information or change system processes
in ways that influence individuals’ congestion weights, thereby improving decentral-
ized decision making.











where Dmin = mink,j{Dkj} and λmax = maxj{
x∗j
x∗j +1
}. Moreover, this bound is tight.
The proof of this result is presented in Appendix A. Intuitively, the bound cap-
tures the trade-off between travel time and congestion necessary to induce an equi-
librium solution. In the bound expression, the values Dmin and λmax capture the arc
with least cost and the arc on which there is the smallest loss of flow, respectively. It is
instructive to examine what happens to the value of the bound when λmax approaches
its limiting values. Recall that 0.5 ≤ λmax < 1. When λmax = 0.5, no more than one





= 2 − (1/2)m−2. The
shortest path bound is dominated by the loss of flow that occurs along the path.
On the other hand, the value of λmax approaches 1 when there is a facility that is






= m−1, where m is the number of facilities. In other words, the
shortest path is bounded by m− 1 times the cost of the most negative arc and there
is very little loss of flow. Thus, when the central optimal solution is more congested,
greater congestion weights are required to ensure that this solution is an equilibrium.
This bound is tighter in systems where many λj values are close to 1, that is, systems
in which many facilities serve lots of customers.
Using similar ideas, we also obtain a path-based bound on the sum of all αj values.
43
It is also useful to characterize the minimum sum of αj values, especially when there is
a cost associated with influencing the importance that decentralized decision makers
place on congestion. The proof of this result is presented in Appendix A.
Theorem 11 The minimum feasible value of
∑












Moreover, this bound is tight.
Again, the congestion weights implied by this bound capture the trade-off between
travel time and congestion that is necessary for the central optimal solution to be an
equilibrium under decentralized decision making.
2.7.3 Optimizing α
Although it is useful to know that feasible α vectors exist under which the central
optimal solution is an equilibrium, more useful in practice is the ability to identify
such congestion weights that also optimize particular policy objectives. In this section,
we introduce three such objectives and demonstrate that finding optimal α values in
these scenarios can be done efficiently.
Before doing so, recall that the dual of problem P̄ is equivalent to a generalized
circulation problem. Wayne [102] developed a polynomial algorithm for solving these
problems that relies on their underlying combinatorial structure. It can be used to
optimize P̄ under any linear objective. As we will demonstrate, important planning
goals can be incorporated into this problem structure. We begin by presenting three
variants of P̄ , after which we summarize observations about these problems.
The first objective we consider is that of minimizing the range of congestion
weights in the system while still finding an α vector under which the central optimal
solution is an equilibrium. In the context of managing a system of public health or
emergency response facilities, this objective represents a desire to reduce perceived
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discrepancies between facilities. Problem P̄R is a modification of our primal problem
P̄ that captures this goal. Although we want to minimize the difference between
αmax and αmin, we maintain the maximization objective for consistency with the
earlier presentation.
(P̄R) = Maximize − (αmax − αmin) (23)
x∗jαj − (x∗k + 1)αk ≤ Dkj ∀ j, k 6= j (24)
αmax − αj ≥ 0 ∀ j (25)
αj − αmin ≥ 0 ∀ j (26)
αj ≥ 0 ∀ j (27)
Here, constraint set (24) comes directly from feasibility problem P ′. Constraints (25)
and (26) define the variables αmax and αmin in terms of the αj’s.
System planners may also be concerned with the total or maximum change in con-
gestion weights that must be made across facilities to achieve an equilibrium solution.
Minimizing the total change in congestion weights can be viewed as minimiz-
ing the required budget for change, since affecting the importance decision makers
place on congestion requires investments in information dissemination or changes in
facility operations. Problem variant P̄sum−∆ seeks to minimize the total change in
congestion weights across all facilities necessary to reach an equilibrium-obtaining α
vector. In this context, we let α0j denote the original congestion weight associated
with facility j. Variables δ+j and δ
−
j measure the positive or negative change, respec-
tively, between α0j and the candidate congestion weights αj. Again, we frame P̄sum−∆
as a maximization problem for consistency.







x∗jαj − (x∗k + 1)αk ≤ Dkj ∀j, k 6= j (29)
αj ≤ α0j + δ+j ∀j (30)
αj ≥ α0j − δ−j ∀j (31)
αj ≥ 0 ∀j (32)
δ+j ≥ 0 ∀j (33)
δ−j ≥ 0 ∀j (34)
Constraint set (29) comes directly from P ′, while constraints (30) and (31) define the
variables αj in terms of the original congestion weight α
0
j and the weight change δ
+
j
and δ−j , respectively.
Similarly, the goal of problem variant P̄max−∆ is minimizing the maximum
change in congestion weights. This objective is relevant if planners want to spread
their resources across the system and avoid solutions which require large changes in
the weights of only one or a few facilities. We measure the maximum change in
congestion weights using δmax. The problem of minimizing the maximum change in
perception is defined as:
(P ′max−∆) = Maximize − δmax (35)
x∗jαj − (x∗k + 1)αk ≤ Dkj ∀j, k 6= j (36)
αj ≤ α0j + δ+j ∀j (37)
αj ≥ α0j − δ−j ∀j (38)
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δmax ≥ δ+j ∀j (39)
δmax ≥ δ−j ∀j (40)
αj ≥ 0 ∀j (41)
δ+j ≥ 0 ∀j (42)
δ−j ≥ 0 ∀j (43)
Constraints (36), (37), and (38) are analogous to the first three constraints of P ′sum−∆.
Constraints (39) and (40) require the new variable δmax to be at least as large as each
of the δ+j and δ
−
j values.
These three variants of P̄ optimize important policy objectives, and their structure
admits an efficient algorithm for finding solutions.
Remark 5 Problems P̄R, P̄sum−∆, and P̄max−∆ are each TVPI linear programming
problems. Because the additional constraints required for these formulations (namely,
(25) and (26) in P̄R, (30) and (31) in P̄sum−∆, and (37), (38), (39), and (40) in
P̄max−∆) are simply definitional, feasibility for each problem follows from Theorem 7.
Moreover, Wayne’s algorithm [102] can find an optimal solution in polynomial time.
This observation assures that we can not only find an α vector under which the
central optimal solution is an equilibrium, but also that this can be done while min-
imizing either the range of congestion weights or the total or maximum change in




This work poses several questions regarding the design and analysis of decentralized
logistics systems, with a particular focus on problems motivated by humanitarian
response. Decentralized decision making is common in such settings, and the use of
optimization approaches that adopt a centralized perspective can lead to poor sys-
tem performance. The work presented here integrates tools from optimization and
game theory to develop prescriptive models for logistics networks that account for
decentralized behavior. It also makes fundamental advances in the design and man-
agement of networks with selfish users. We present an efficient algorithm for finding
stable decentralized solutions and find new price of anarchy and price of stability
results for a class of decentralized network problems, and demonstrate that system
performance varies depending on the weights that decentralized decision makers place
on congestion. We introduce a novel mechanism for improving decentralized perfor-
mance by changing congestion weights and explore insights about what these values
can or must be. In Chapter 3, we demonstrate that these advancements are useful in
practice with an application using data from a large-scale distribution scenario.
The answers to the questions posed here will add to the fundamental understand-
ing of decentralized systems and provide tools for their management. They will also
provide a base upon which researchers can build further, including the incorporation
of congestion weights that are specific to individuals in addition to those associated
with facilities, learning on the network, social interactions among agents, and the
dynamics of decentralized systems over time. As such, they represent an important
contribution to the theory and practice of managing decentralized logistics systems.
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALIZED DECISIONS ON
THE EQUITY OF SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the impact of decentralized decision making using data
from an actual large-scale distribution effort. This study makes several important
contributions. First, it demonstrates that the methods introduced in the previous
chapter are applicable to large-scale problems arising in practice. It integrates recent
developments in the field of spatial statistics with optimization, game theory, and
geographic information systems (GIS). This novel integration makes use of data from
many sources to explain the impact of past decisions about distribution system design,
which in turn can lead to improved decisions in the future. The results confirm
the importance of accounting for decentralized behavior in system design and point
to opportunities to use the mechanism from the first part of the thesis in future
distribution efforts of this nature.
3.2 Background
This study is based on an effort to deliver a particular type of product to a large
number of people in a limited time period during which demand for the product
exceeded supply. The work is done in collaboration with the organization responsible
for coordinating the effort, but details of the project are withheld until authorization
has been given for material to be made public. Where complete citations of data
sources cannot provided in the context of this thesis document, full details will be
made available upon approval for release in a published paper describing this work
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to the scientific community and policy makers. In this chapter, we will simply refer
to national, state, and local decision makers, with products distributed directly to
consumers from service locations.
The supply chain for the product consisted of several stages. The national organi-
zation procured the product from manufacturers, who sent the product via third-party
distribution centers to service locations designated by each state. (In some regions,
the supply chain included a stage of local distribution. There was limited visibility
of this stage, so it is excluded from our analysis.) Individuals chose where to pick
up the product from among the service locations. In the stage of the distribution
that we study, demand for the product significantly outpaced supply. The central-
ized organization allocated the limited supply among state partners using a pro rata
method, meaning that each state received a fraction of the total supply equal to that
state’s proportion of the total population. Each state then determined how its allo-
cation would be divided among the designated service locations, each of which had
to submit requests for the product. Since requests exceeded availability, some states
adopted a pro rata policy similar to the national organization while others priori-
tized certain types of service locations or used other methods to allocate the product.
While the national pro rata approach represents an equal allocation from the state
point of view, it does not preclude differences in individuals’ access to the product.
Our study examines the shipments of product at the service location level and the
resulting availability at the census tract level to identify potential inequities arising
from the distribution approach described.
To identify inequities, if they exist, we model the distribution system from two
perspectives. The first uses optimization and game theory to represent the choices of
individuals in the system, who choose from among facilities depending on distance,
the number of people at a facility, and the quantity of product available. We contrast
the results of this model, which incorporates individuals’ choices, with a traditional
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optimization model that assumes a centralized planner can control actions across the
entire system to minimize the total distance and facility congestion. The output
of the optimization models allows us to measure individuals’ access to the product.
We then use spatial statistics to examine differences in accessibility across space and
correlations between accessibility and socioeconomic variables.
3.3 Research Goals
The research goals of this study are three-fold. First, we model an actual product dis-
tribution scenario using the ideas presented in Chapter 2 and examine the differences
in system outcomes under the centralized and decentralized frameworks. Second, we
measure individuals’ access to the product as a function of the distance traveled and
congestion experienced in obtaining the product and examine inequities in accessi-
bility across the system. Finally, we explain the observed inequities as functions of
spatially-correlated variables such as demographic characteristics and the availability
of related service locations. Together, these goals lead to insights that can inform
future response policies and planning.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.4 and 3.5, we
discuss the data sources and methods used in this study, respectively. Section 3.6
notes the limitations of the study. We present our results in Section 3.7 and discuss
interpretations and recommendations in Section 3.8. We conclude in Section 3.9 with
a description of ongoing and future research related to this study.
3.4 Data
This study makes use of three types of data, namely those that characterize product
demand, product supply, and socioeconomic factors that may be correlated with
modeling outcomes.
Product Demand: We take the entire population of the affected area as the demand
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for the product in our study, and we examine populations at the census tract level.
According to the Census Bureau [94], census tracts are “small, relatively permanent
geographic entities within counties.” They are designed to have between 2500 and 8000
residents, with an average population of about 4000. Census tracts are determined
with community input and are relatively homogenous with respect to economic status
and demographics, at least at the time that they are established. We choose the census
tract level because it allows us to look at local impacts of decisions made at the state
or national level. We assume that the population of a census tract is located at its
center of population, also called the population centroid [96]. We use the latitude
and longitude coordinates of this centroid to calculate distances to the facilities that
are providing the product. The distances are determined from each census tract to
every service location within 50 miles using the U.S. highway network [77] via GIS
software [32].
Product Supply: The street addresses of about 50,000 service locations and the
quantities of product available at each location during the shortage period were pro-
vided by the national organization. We geocode the addresses of these locations,
which requires using GIS software [32] to match street addresses to latitude and lon-
gitude coordinates. The geocoding success rate is 90 percent for the service locations
nationwide. We impute coordinates for an additional 8.6 percent of the locations by
sampling a random point within the zip code associated each location.
Socioeconomic Factors: In our statistical analysis, we examine a number of so-
cioeconomic factors to determine their relationships with the model outcomes. We
obtain data on per capita income, median household income, and race/ethnicity from
Community Sourcebook·America – ESRI [31]. These data are acquired at the census
tract level and updated yearly based on U.S. Census Bureau data. Using the area of
each census tract [95], we calculate its population density. The percent of census tract
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population living below the federal poverty level is obtained from The Public Health
Disparities Geocoding Project [90]. Finally, we obtain a listing of all locations that
could potentially distribute the product from a national database and geocode their
addresses. (To ensure confidentiality of the work, this source is withheld from the the-
sis.) We calculate the ratio between the number of potential service locations within
20 miles of each census tract and the tract’s population density. This value quanti-
fies the relative availability of possible service locations, and we explore this variable
to determine the degree to which larger service infrastructure issues contribute to
differences in accessibility to the product in question.
3.5 Definitions and Methods
The methods we use to measure the accessibility of the product and understand
differences in accessibility associated with socioeconomic variables are described in
this section. We begin by defining accessibility and equity in the context of this
study, introduce the models we use to obtain measures of accessibility, and describe
statistical procedures we use to identify factors associated with inequities.
3.5.1 Measuring Accessibility and Equity
The literature contains many definitions of both accessibility and equity in access to
public services [11, 23, 54, 62, 65, 66, 85, 86]. As in [54], we make the distinction
between potential and realized access. Potential access is a measure of the availability
of the service to an individual and is most often characterized by distance. Realized
access indicates whether or not an individual actually received the service and de-
pends upon many factors, including potential access and demographic variables. Data
concerning realized access are not available at the local level for the majority of our
study area. Consequently, we develop models of the distribution system to measure
individuals’ potential access to the product. Potential access in the context of this
study is the availability of the product to an individual and depends on the distances
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to facilities distributing the product, the number of other people who choose a facility,
and the quantity of product available at each location.
We define three metrics to quantify potential access, the values for which are cal-
culated using the output of the optimization models described in Section 3.5.2. First,
we compute a distance metric for each census tract by averaging the distances trav-
eled by each of the individuals in that census tract to produce an aggregate measure.
Many models that examine decisions affecting access to public goods and services use
distance as a principle component of individuals’ utility functions, including gravity-
based models that are common in designing and assessing public service systems (for
example, [45, 54, 62]), location models for community health centers [40], and general
facility location models [26]. Our second metric is the average congestion (or viewed
another way, the scarcity) experienced by people from a census tract, where conges-
tion at a facility is defined as the number of people per product available at that
facility. Congestion is a key component of utility in traffic models for both highway
and computer networks (for example, [82]) and scarcity has been shown to dissuade
individuals from seeking products in some contexts [15]. Finally, we consider the sum
of the first two metrics. Utility functions that combine a constant component, such
as distance, with a congestion component have been widely used in computer science
and traffic theory to incorporate customer utility. Moreover, researchers have identi-
fied the need for studies that integrate congestion and distance measures in location
modeling [30, 78]. Together, the distance, congestion, and combined metrics allow us
to examine the different components of potential access.
We seek to understand inequities in potential access as they relate to socioeco-
nomic factors and other system variables. For a summary of different measures of
equity, the reader is referred to the review by Marsh and Schilling [66]. Operations
research and management science have traditionally been concerned with efficiency
and effectiveness rather than equity, but in particular there are a number of facility
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location models that include some notion of equity [30, 65, 71, 85]. These papers are
meant to be an illustrative, not exhaustive, list; for a thorough review of equity in
location modeling, see [30] and the references cited therein. Braveman and Gruskin
[11] address the reasons that studying equity is important, stating: “Health inequities
put disadvantaged groups at further disadvantage with respect to health, diminishing
opportunities to be healthy.” While their work focuses on health, similar reasons ap-
ply to equitable access to food, clean water, and other necessities. These reasons are
relevant to our study, because an inadequate distribution system can lead to poorer
outcomes for those affected by this scenario. Increasingly, researchers are using GIS
tools and census information to examine health outcomes and equity in access to
public services as a function of socioeconomic variables; see, for example, [13, 58, 88].
We adopt a definition of equity that is similar to that described in [11]. Equity
in potential access to the product is the absence of systematic disparities in access
between different groups of people, identified by location or underlying socioeconomic
variables. In the context of the problem we consider, understanding differences in
potential access that are associated with identifiable social groups or characteristics
can inform policy decisions. For example, this may help determine how much product
to send to which locations or whether it is necessary to recruit additional service
locations in specific regions. Using this information, future response efforts can focus
on plans, interventions, or resource allocations that have greater impact and improve
equity for all those affected.
3.5.2 Optimization Models
We adopt two modeling approaches to evaluate the potential accessibility of the prod-
uct in this study and compare their outputs. Before introducing the models them-
selves, we discuss the merit of using optimization to determine the accessibility of this
product. Other alternatives might be measuring the number of products available per
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census tract or per person in a census tract, counting all census tracts within a cer-
tain number of miles from a facility as being served by that location, or counting all
facilities within a threshold distance as serving a particular census tract. These alter-
natives suffer from one or more drawbacks. The first imposes artificial boundaries on
individuals’ willingness to travel to receive the product. The second leads to double-
counting of people since populations may be close to multiple facilities; this does
not provide an accurate picture of the access to the product. Conversely, the third
leads to double-counting of products. None of these approaches accounts for individu-
als’ decreasing willingness to travel as distances increase nor the interaction between
distance traveled, number of people (congestion) at a facility, and the number of avail-
able products. More sophisticated gravity-based models (for example, [45, 54, 62])
account for these factors, but these approaches do not model actual choices about
which facility to visit and the resulting outcomes of those choices. Optimization is
well-suited to handle these aspects.
The optimization models we use to determine the assignment of individuals to fa-
cilities are adapted from those presented in Chapter 2. The reader is referred to that
part of the thesis for a detailed discussion of the models and their theoretical prop-
erties. Here we present the specific implementations used in this study. We examine
the challenge of allocating the product from two perspectives: that of individuals
choosing where to pick up the product in a way that optimizes their own objectives,
and that of a centralized planner with the ability to assign each person in the system
to optimize overall system efficiency. The input for both models includes the ship-
ment locations, product quantities received during the shortage period, census tract
populations, and distances between census tract centers of population and facilities.
Each model produces metrics, namely, the average distance, average congestion, and
sum of these values, that we then use to evaluate the potential accessibility of the
product at the census tract level.
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In contrast to the models presented in Chapter 2, both the decentralized and
centralized models now account for the capacity of each facility. We define capacity
as the number of products available at the facility. Note that despite this addition to
the modeling framework, the results on the complexity of finding a stable equilibrium
solution (1) and on finding an equilibrium-obtaining congestion weight vector (7) still
hold.
3.5.2.1 Decentralized Model
Individuals’ choices about which facility they will visit to receive the product are a
key component of our models. We assume that individuals know where the product is
available and in what quantities. (In this and many similar scenarios, such information
is often available online.) Given these parameters, we model user choice as a network
congestion game with unweighted, atomic, unsplittable flow (defined in Chapter 2).
For model tractability, we assume that each census tract population is divided into
communities of size c and therefore round the population of each census tract to the
nearest number. (For this study, c = 100.) All c individuals in a community are
assumed to visit the same facility, but different communities within a census tract
may visit different facilities. We seek an equilibrium, or stable, decentralized solution,
which is defined as a solution that satisfies the following condition for all communities.














∀ k 6= j. (44)
Here j is community i’s facility in the solution being considered, while xlj = 1 if
community l is served at facility j and 0 otherwise. Values dij and dik represent the
distance from community i to facilities j and k, respectively. The community size is
given by c. The value sj is the product supply available at facility j.
Expression (44) compares the cost incurred by an individual in community i if facility
j is chosen with the cost of an alternative facility k. If the inequality holds for all
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alternative facilities, then community i has no incentive to switch unilaterally.
The results of Theorem 1 in Chapter 2, which states that an equilibrium solution
can be found efficiently using a minimum cost flow algorithm on a transformation of
the decentralized network, still hold for this problem. Therefore, we use the mini-
mum cost flow approach previously developed to find a solution to the decentralized
problem in this setting.
3.5.2.2 Centralized Model
For comparison to the decentralized model, we also examine a centralized planner’s
model. This modeling approach assumes that a single decision maker can determine
where all individuals will obtain the product. The planner’s goal is to minimize the
total travel distance and congestion while ensuring that all product is distributed.
This approach is similar to the centralized model presented in Chapter 2, but it has
two key differences. First, the centralized planner’s notion of congestion now depends
not only on the number of individuals served but also on facility capacity, or the
number of items available. Second, we require that all of these items be distributed.
Recall that this study is concerned with the distribution phase during which demand
is greater than supply, so the centralized planner seeks to have the greatest impact




















xij = 1 ∀i (46)
n∑
i=1
pixij ≥ sj ∀j (47)
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0 ≤ xij ≤ 1 ∀i, j (48)
In the centralized planner’s model, decision variable xij ∈ [0, 1] denotes the frac-
tion of the population of census tract i (i = 1, . . . , n) served at facility j (j = 1, . . . ,m).
The parameters of the model include pi, the population of census tract i; dij, the travel
distance from census tract i to facility j; and sj, the supply of products shipped to
facility j. Constraint (46) requires that the entire population of each census tract be
assigned to a facility, while constraint (47) enforces the requirement that all of the
product be distributed.
3.5.3 Statistical Analysis of Results
The optimization models just described produce distance and congestion metrics at
the census tract level. These are measures of the access that individuals in that
census tract have to the product. We seek to understand how and to what extent
accessibility is correlated with the socioeconomic characteristics of the census tract
population and with the availability of potential service locations. To examine these
relationships, we conduct a statistical analysis.
Both the output of the optimization models (distance and congestion metrics)
and the socioeconomic factors are spatially correlated. It is necessary to account
for this correlation in the statistical procedures used to estimate the associations
between factors and response. To accomplish this, we implement a statistical method
called a varying coefficient model. Like traditional linear regression, this approach
estimates coefficients for the factors and fits an expression to predict the response
variable. However, unlike linear regression, the regression coefficients are permitted
to vary across geographic space or time. Researchers have applied varying coefficient
models to time-dependent data [34, 43, 47, 49, 106, 108], data that vary spatially
[6, 38, 101], and data that vary both in time and space [86]. Gelfand et al. [38] and
Waller et al. [101] review existing varying coefficient models applied to spatial data
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and propose Bayesian procedures to model these scenarios. A Bayesian procedure
can account for multi-collinearity in the explanatory variables, but such methods
are computationally intensive even for small data sets. Since our data consists of a
large number of geographic locations, we estimate the space-varying coefficients using
recently-developed nonparametric methods.
We introduce the following space-varying coefficient model to estimate the rela-
tionships between accessibility of the product and the socioeconomic factors.
E[Yj|X] = β0(gj) + β1(gj)X1,j + . . . + βR(gj)XR,j (49)
In this model, the observed data are denoted (Yj, {Xr,j, r = 1, . . . , R},) where
Yj = Y (gj) is the response variable (either distance or congestion) and Xr,j = Xr(gj)
is a set of covariates (socioeconomic factors) observed at location gj = (gj1, gj2), for
j = 1, . . . , G. In our model, gj1 and gj2 simply denote the latitude and longitude of
the census tract center of population. Finally, βr(g) for r = 1, . . . , R are smooth
coefficient functions that may vary in space. The first term of the expression, β0(gj),
represents a space-varying intercept value.
We estimate the unknown coefficient functions, βr(g) for r = 1, . . . , R, using
nonparametric methods, namely thin plate splines [104]. This approach is selected
because it balances goodness of fit, smoothness of resulting coefficient functions, and
computational effort. It is implemented using functions in the R statistical software
library mgcv [104]. The output of the procedure includes both estimates of the co-
efficient functions themselves and information to make inference on the shapes of
these functions. Not all regression coefficients exhibit statistically significant vari-
ability in space. We use simultaneous confidence bands, introduced in [86], to de-
termine whether coefficients are constant, linear, or nonlinear across space. Based
on these results, we also examine the statistical significance of constant coefficients
using conventional hypothesis testing. Using this approach, we determine the set
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of socioeconomic factors that best explains the spatial variability in access to the
product.
3.6 Limitations
This study has several limitations. It assumes that, although decentralized decision
makers may consider several locations and the number of people likely to visit each
one, they ultimately choose only one location for service. For model tractability in the
decentralized scenario, we assume that all members of communities of a specified size
choose the same location. Census tracts whose total population is less than half of the
community size are ignored by that model. (This represents less than 0.0002 percent
of the population for the regions discussed in this chapter.) The decentralized model
identifies one equilibrium solution, but others may exist. Distances in our models
were measured from the center of population of the census tract to the service loca-
tion using the U.S. highway network. These distances are likely to be less accurate for
census tracts with large areas and widely dispersed populations, as well as for areas
with limited U.S. highway infrastructure. In the accessibility metric that combines
both distance and congestion, we assume that these values can be represented on a
common scale (for example, units of time or disutility) without further conversion;
other methods of scaling the values for compatibility could be employed. Geocoded
locations could not be identified for 1.7 percent of service locations nationwide; these
are excluded from the study. This analysis considers only the product quantities dur-
ing the shortage period. It takes all product shipments during that period as a single
set and ignores redistribution of the product beyond the service locations selected by
the state partners; the latter is more appropriate in some states than in others. In the
statistical analysis, we have used data from a national database of potential service
locations relevant to this distribution effort to estimate the availability of such ser-
vices. To our knowledge, actual data regarding receipt of the product by individuals
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at the local level is not available for most regions.
3.7 Results
Here we present the results of the study for the state of Georgia. The analysis includes
1,616 census tracts with a total population of 8,186,453, as well as over 2,000 service
locations representing a total stock of more than 2,000,000 items during the shortage
period. In Section 3.7.1, we compare the allocation of products under the centralized
and decentralized optimization models. This is followed by a statistical analysis of the
relationships between the congestion accessibility metric and a set of socioeconomic
factors in Section 3.7.2.
3.7.1 Allocations and Accessibility Measures
Both the centralized and decentralized optimization models introduced in Section
3.5.2 were solved using CPLEX 12.1 optimization software [51] implemented on a
Debian 4.0/4.1 GNU/Linux x86-64 system with access to 32 GB RAM. A community
size of 100 people was used in the decentralized model. (One census tract with a
population of only 18 was thus excluded from that model.) An equilibrium solution
to the decentralized model was found in 5.03 hours, while the centralized model
required 1.00 hour.
In Figures 7-9, the resulting distance, congestion, and total metrics for the cen-
tralized (a) and decentralized (b) models are illustrated, along with the difference in
metrics between the two models (c). The figures plot the natural log of the respec-
tive metrics measured at the census tract level and smooth these values over space
to produce a continuous picture of the variability in potential spatial accessibility.
In Figure 7, the red part of the color spectrum indicates larger distances traveled
for service and thus lower accessibility, while blue colors indicate smaller distances
and thus greater accessibility. In Figure 8, red (respectively, blue) indicates larger
(smaller) numbers of people relative to the available product quantity. Similarly in
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Figure 9, the red part of the spectrum identifies areas with larger total costs, whereas
areas shown with blue experienced smaller totals of distance and congestion.
In Figure 7, the differences between distances traveled in the centralized and
decentralized systems are subtle, but examining the figures together illustrates that
there are generally fewer and smaller areas of dark red in the decentralized map.
This indicates that distances were somewhat smaller in the decentralized system,
which occurs because communities are optimizing local objectives. Figure 7(c) plots
decentralized minus centralized distance, further clarifying the areas where the two
results differ most. Across census tracts, distances traveled in the centralized system
ranged from 0 to 24.8 miles (recall that the map has a logarithmic scale), while those
in the decentralized system were between 0 and 21.5 miles. Although the centralized
planner may impose greater travel to mitigate congestion, the decentralized decision
makers do not. Note also that in both cases, there are a few locations with extremely
small travel distances. Areas with larger distances tend to be more rural in both
cases, although not exclusively.
Figure 8 illustrates the resulting congestion relative to facility capacity for the cen-
tralized and decentralized models, as well as the differences between the two systems.
The values are between 1.0 and 19.0 persons per product in the centralized system,
while the decentralized congestion ranged from 0.5 to 25.4 persons per product. The
colors in the centralized map on the left are more homogeneous than those in the
decentralized map on the right. This indicates that the decentralized solution shows
more variation in congestion across space; the congested areas are more congested,
while the areas with excess vaccine are more definitive as well. Here, the darkest blue
colors represent negative natural log values and indicate that the number of products
actually exceeds the number of individuals served in that area. When the community
size is 100, approximately 1.1 percent of facilities had some unallocated product; this
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Figure 7: Comparison of distance between the centralized (a) and decentralized (b)
models in Georgia, and difference between them (c).
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Figure 8: Comparison of congestion between the centralized (a) and decentralized
(b) models in Georgia, and difference between them (c).
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accounted for 1.9 percent of the total available product in the state. The under-
utilized facilities include some with very small shipment quantities in areas where
people had many facility alternatives, as well as some facilities that received an un-
usually large number of products that could not all be allocated given the number of
individuals willing to travel to those facilities. In our computational experiments, we
observe that the number of unallocated products increases as the community size in
the decentralized model increases. This arises primarily as a result of communities
avoiding facilities with very small product quantities, such as those that received the
minimum shipment of only 100 products, because the community size overwhelms
the product availability. Although increasing community size is a way to yield faster
solutions or to solve models for larger regions, care must be taken to understand the
implications of this modeling choice.
In Figure 9, we plot the sum of the distance and congestion experienced at the
census tract level for both the centralized and decentralized systems. The range of
centralized values is from 1.6 to 30.3, while the corresponding decentralized values
are between 1.5 and 30.8. The differences between the systems using the aggregate
measure are smaller than differences between either the distance or congestion mea-
sures alone; these differences are illustrated in Figure 9(c). From these maps, the
ability of a centralized planner to smooth the effects of distance and congestion using
a system-wide perspective is apparent, but the centralized approach ignores individ-
ual choices. The spatial variation in the decentralized results is more pronounced.
In both systems, however, there is evidence of spatial differences in access to the
product.
In addition to examining the differences between the centralized and decentral-
ized systems, we consider the sensitivity of the decentralized results to the individuals’
objective functions. Since actual data regarding individuals’ choices about where to
66
































 North Atlanta GA
 Redan GA
 Roswell GA




 Warner Robins GA
Log(Average Distance + Average Congestion)
 in Centralized System
(a) Centralized Distance + Congestion
































 North Atlanta GA
 Redan GA
 Roswell GA




 Warner Robins GA
Log(Average Distance + Average Congestion)
 in Decentralized System
(b) Decentralized Distance + Conges-
tion





























 North Atlanta GA
 Redan GA
 Roswell GA




 Warner Robins GA
Total: Decentralized − Centralized
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tion) - Centralized (Distance + Con-
gestion)
Figure 9: Comparison of distance plus congestion between the centralized (a) and
decentralized (b) models in Georgia, and difference between them (c).
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receive the product are not available, we investigate several possible decentralized ob-
jectives including distance only, number of people only, number of people per product,
and weighted combinations of these factors. While the resulting measures of accessi-
bility, namely distance and congestion, vary depending on the decentralized objective
function, spatial variability in these measures persists. For example, the resulting
number of people per product (or congestion) under several decentralized objective
functions is illustrated in Figures 10(a)-10(d). The results under the original Equilib-
rium Condition given by Inequality (44) are shown in Figure 10(a) and re-scaled for
comparison to the other objectives. Figure 10(b) illustrates the average congestion at
the census tract level when the decentralized objective includes only distance. This
value exhibits a great deal of spatial variability. (Note here that the scale also covers
a wider range than in the other figures.) The patterns change as the decentralized
objective moves from this extreme to an intermediate objective considering both dis-
tance and a weighted measure of persons per product (Figure 10(c)), and finally to
the opposite extreme in which only the number of people at a facility is considered
(Figure 10(d)). These results illustrate that spatial variability persists across a wide
range of decentralized decision parameters. In what follows, we focus on the results
for the base case that was introduced in Section 3.5.2.
3.7.2 Statistical Analysis of Socioeconomic Factors
We use the space-varying coefficient model described in Section 3.5.3 to examine
relationships between the congestion accessibility metric produced by the optimiza-
tion models and a series of socioeconomic factors. In our analysis, we consider three
different factors that reflect income: per capita income, median household income,
and percent of population living below the federal poverty level. We examine six
factors reflecting race and ethnicity: percent of population that is Black, percent of
population that is Hispanic, percent of population that is Black or Hispanic, Black
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Figure 10: Congestion under various decentralized objective functions.
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population counts, Hispanic population counts, and Black plus Hispanic population
counts. Finally, we include population density and the number of potential service
locations relative to population density in the models. For clarity of exposition, in the
remaining discussion we refer to the latter factor as service availability. We use the
natural log of all factor values so that differences can be seen more readily. Factors
that are highly collinear (for example, per capita income and percent of population
below the federal poverty level) are not used together within a model. The socioeco-
nomic predictors are all measured at the census tract level. These factors are selected
because income, minority group status, urban or rural location, and general avail-
ability of public services have all been associated with differing health outcomes or
accessibility to other public services.
Here we present the results of the spatial statistical analysis examining the as-
sociation of the aforementioned factors with the congestion accessibility metric. We
implement the space-varying coefficient model with an intercept and four factors,
examining the impact of different combinations of factors. We limit the models we
consider to four explanatory factors for two reasons: using too many factors can
cloud meaningful relationships and solving varying coefficient models is computation-
ally challenging for a region of this size even with four factors. The analysis is done
using R statistical software [91]. The model output includes the fitted space-varying
coefficients for each factor, a shape (constant, linear, or nonlinear) for each factor,
and model residuals. For factors that the model suggests are constant across space,
we test the hypothesis that the factor is significantly different from 0 and report
the p-value of that test. If the model suggests that factors are linear or nonlinear,
the shape itself indicates that there is spatial variability captured by this factor and
suggests significance.
Models with different factors are compared on the basis of several criteria. First,
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factor significance (including shape, as described above) and coefficient range are con-
sidered. Coefficients with greater absolute value indicate a greater contribution by
that factor to the model. Second, we test for auto-correlation in the model residu-
als. If auto-correlation is low, this indicates that the factors in the model explain a
substantial portion of the spatial variability in access to the product. Based on this
comparison of candidate models, we select the one that most completely explains the
spatial variations in the congestion accessibility metric.
Centralized Model Results
We find strong association between the spatial variability in the centralized system
congestion and service availability, per capita income, percent of the population that
is Black or Hispanic, and population density. As shown in Figure 12, the analysis
indicates that the coefficient for service availability is constant across the state and
its estimated value is -0.6975 (p-value = 0.000372). This means that as the number
of potential service locations increases in relation to the underlying population, the
congestion experienced decreases.
Per capita income is shown to have a nonlinear coefficient, meaning that the
level of impact is different across the state. The range of coefficient values for this
factor is [-1.2196, 1.2389]. Figure 11(b) maps the per capita income at the census
tract level across the state; the corresponding factor coefficient fitted by the model
is shown in Figure 13. Areas where the coefficient is smallest, which are blue on the
map, experienced lower congestion than would be expected based on their own per
capita income and the average effect that per capita income has across the state.
On the other hand, dark red areas where the coefficient is largest experienced greater
congestion than expected. The coefficients corresponding to per capita income exhibit
both the largest magnitude and the largest range among the four factors in the model.
The percent of the census tract population that is Black or Hispanic also has a
nonlinear effect on the congestion across the state, with a range of [-0.6808, 0.5168].
71
The factor and coefficient values are illustrated in Figures 11(c) and 14. While the
magnitude of this impact is smaller than that of income or population density in
many areas, the factor is still significant.
The effect of population density is nonlinear across the state, with coefficient
values in the range [-1.034, -0.0922]. Its value everywhere, however, is negative. This
means that congestion decreases as population density increases, although to varying
degrees depending on the part of the state. The impact is greater in areas that are
blue or green in Figure 15.
Figure 16(a) maps the residuals of the space-varying coefficient model for the
centralized system congestion. These values represent the spatial variability left un-
explained by the model. The blue colors in some locations indicate that the conges-
tion is lower than our statistical model predicts, while patches of red indicate that
the model under-predicts congestion. Overall, the statistical model does well; there
is little evidence of auto-correlation in the residuals and the maximum correlation
coefficient is less than 0.08.
Decentralized Model Results
The socioeconomic factors that best explain the spatial variability in system con-
gestion in the decentralized system are service availability, percent of population
below the federal poverty level, percent of the population that is Black or Hispanic,
and population density. The factors are the same as those in the centralized model,
with the exception that per capita income is replaced by percent of population below
the poverty level.
The analysis indicates that the service availability has a linear shape across the
state but that it is always inversely related to decentralized system congestion. The
range of the coefficient is [-1.4441, -0.1279]. Figure 17 illustrates that the magnitude
of this effect is greater as one moves southeast across the state. The average value of
this coefficient, -0.786, is also smaller than the corresponding constant coefficient for
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service availability in the centralized model, indicating that the impact of this factor
is slightly more pronounced in the decentralized system.
The percent of the census tract population living below the federal poverty level
also exhibits a linear pattern, with coefficients ranging from -0.4809 to 1.1425. This
indicates that in some areas, a higher fraction of people living in poverty is associated
with decreased congestion, while in other areas the opposite is true. Lower coefficients
are found in the north part of the state and generally increase as one moves south,
as shown in Figure 18.
The third factor shown to be significantly related to decentralized system con-
gestion is the percent of the census tract population that is Black or Hispanic. The
coefficients of this factor are nonlinear across the state and their range is [-0.6531,
0.4376]. In the blue areas shown on the map in Figure 19, this factor is associated
with decreased congestion, while those shown in red experience a positive correlation
between the percent of the population in these minority groups and the decentralized
system congestion.
Finally, population density is a significant factor. The corresponding coefficients
are nonlinear, falling in the range [-2.6888, 0.9052]. Figure 20 illustrates some areas (in
dark blue) of the state in which the population density is associated with a much lower
congestion than would be expected based on the statewide average of the coefficient
value, while in others (dark red) the opposite is true. In the decentralized model, the
population density factor coefficients exhibit both the greatest magnitude and range
among the four model factors.
The residuals of the best-fitting model for the decentralized system are shown
in Figure 16(b). The map illustrates a number of locations where the model under-
predicts (red) or over-predicts (blue) the congestion found by the optimization model.
The residuals of this model exhibit some auto-correlation, with a maximum correla-
tion coefficient of approximately 0.25. This implies that there are more unexplained
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inequities left in the decentralized model. This observation holds even when the same
set of predictors is used for both scenarios.
3.8 Discussion
In both models, the results of this study indicate that there were geographical in-
equities in product allocation and accessibility across Georgia. Moreover, these dif-
ferences were more pronounced in the model that explicitly captures individuals’
choices than in the centralized model. Generally speaking, areas near the state’s
larger cities experienced lower values for both distance and congestion relative to the
total product available, translating into better potential access. This is consistent
with the mostly-negative correlation in the space-varying coefficient models between
congestion and population density. Exceptions include those areas indicated by no-
ticeably darker blues in Figures 7-9, evident especially in Figure 8. The central- and
southwest parts of the state, as well as the central-east, appear to have experienced
lower potential access. While some of this may have been mitigated by having ac-
cess to product in neighboring states, preliminary results for the region-wide system
indicate that this does not fully explain this observation.
As has been shown when considering access to other public or health-related ser-
vices, socioeconomic characteristics are associated with inequities in access to the
product we study. The best-fitting statistical models for both the centralized and
decentralized systems include factors representing the availability of candidate ser-
vice locations, income, minority group population, and population density. Despite
the fact that our service availability factor is based on all potential service locations,
rather than on facilities actually distributing the product, this variable is significant
in both models. Its negative correlation with congestion is indicative of the impact
that differences in the underlying service infrastructure may have on the ability to
mount an equitable distribution effort. Recruiting and retaining additional service
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locations in under-served regions is a long process, but this study points to the need
for awareness of this challenge in planning for future response efforts.
There are several practical implications of this research. The results of the sta-
tistical analysis leave more unexplained inequities in the decentralized model. This
reflects, at least in part, the local nature of decentralized decision making. Evidence
of inequities persists even in the solution to a centralized optimization problem. The
appropriateness of the decentralized or centralized frameworks in any particular con-
text depends on whether individuals choose or a centralized authority can determine
assignments of people to facilities. For example, states could adopt a distribution
plan wherein individuals are assigned to service locations, much like the practice of
assigning voters to polling places. Overall, this study demonstrates that both de-
centralized decision making and the state’s choice of service locations and quantities
have an impact on the resulting accessibility of the product at the census tract level.
Inequities can arise even if the original allocation from the national level to each state
is done pro rata, a seemingly equitable approach. To address this phenomenon in fu-
ture distribution efforts, the national organization and state partners should consider
the following actions:
• Examine proposed distribution plans and product allocations to assess their
implications for accessibility and equity prior to implementation.
• When recruiting facilities and community groups to serve as service locations
during the planning or early response stages, make concerted efforts to involve
those from areas shown to be inequitable in previous responses or other non-
emergency initiatives.
• Consider using a model that identifies an equitable solution and adopts the
equilibrium-obtaining congestion weights framework (from Chapter 2) to im-
prove decentralized system performance.
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3.9 Ongoing and Future Research
This research illustrates the importance of considering the overall system and ac-
counting for individuals’ choices during planning for large-scale distribution efforts.
We are pursuing several additional areas of research related to this study. Currently,
we are analyzing the output of the centralized and decentralized models presented
here for a multi-state region in the southeast United States. This analysis demon-
strates the applicability of our method to larger geographical areas and facilitates the
comparison of inequities and important factors between states. We will investigate
whether the factors that have been shown to be significantly correlated with outcomes
in Georgia are similar to or different from those in other areas, as well as investigate
patterns in the region as a whole. Following this analysis, we will proceed with other
geographic regions. Although the current study focuses on the entire supply of the
product during the shortage period, a subset of this product was intended specifically
for children. Our future work will examine this specific subset in an effort to deter-
mine whether potential spatial access differed for children and how these differences
are correlated with socioeconomic variables. Our aim in this series of studies is to
identify regional similarities and differences, understand the factors driving these re-
sults, and develop recommendations that will lead to improved distribution efforts in
the future.
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(a) Factor values for log(service availability).
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(b) Factor values for log(per capita income).
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(c) Factor values for log(percent Black + per-
cent Hispanic).
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(d) Factor values for log(population density).
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(e) Factor values for log(percent population
below federal poverty level).
Figure 11: Explanatory factor values.
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 Warner Robins GA
Regression Coefficient: 
 Log(Service Availability)
Figure 12: Coefficient values for log(service availability), controlling for income, per-
cent population Black or Hispanic, and population density in the centralized system;
coefficient shape is constant.
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 Warner Robins GA
Regression Coefficient: 
 Log(Per Capita Income)
Figure 13: Coefficient values for log(per capita income), controlling for service avail-
ability, percent population Black or Hispanic, and population density in the central-
ized system; coefficient shape is nonlinear.
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 Warner Robins GA
Regression Coefficient: 
 Log(Percent Census Tract Population that is Black or Hispanic)
Figure 14: Coefficient values for log(percent Black + percent Hispanic), controlling
for service availability, income, and population density in the centralized system;
coefficient shape is nonlinear.
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 Warner Robins GA
Regression Coefficient: 
 Log(Population Density)
Figure 15: Coefficient values for log(population density), controlling for service avail-
ability, income, and percent population Black or Hispanic in the centralized system;
coefficient shape is nonlinear.
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Regression Residuals
(a) Centralized Residuals
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Regression Residuals
(b) Decentralized Residuals
Figure 16: Model residuals.
































 North Atlanta GA
 Redan GA
 Roswell GA




 Warner Robins GA
Regression Coefficient: 
 Log(Service Availability)
Figure 17: Coefficient values for log(service availability), controlling for percent pop-
ulation below poverty level, percent population Black or Hispanic, and population
density in the decentralized system; coefficient shape is linear.
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 Warner Robins GA
Regression Coefficient: 
 Log(Percent Population below Poverty Level)
Figure 18: Coefficient values for log(percent population below federal poverty level),
controlling for service availability, percent population Black or Hispanic, and popu-
lation density in the decentralized system; coefficient shape is linear.
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 Roswell GA




 Warner Robins GA
Regression Coefficient: 
 Log(Percent Census Tract Population that is Black or Hispanic)
Figure 19: Coefficient values for log(percent Black + percent Hispanic), controlling
for service availability, percent population below federal poverty level, and population
density in the decentralized system; coefficient shape is nonlinear.
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 Warner Robins GA
Regression Coefficient: 
 Log(Population Density)
Figure 20: Coefficient values for log(population density), controlling for service avail-
ability, percent population below poverty level, and percent population Black or His-
panic in the decentralized system; coefficient shape is nonlinear.
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CHAPTER IV
DISASTER RESPONSE LOGISTICS AT WAFFLE HOUSE
RESTAURANTS
4.1 Introduction
Supply chain management practitioners and researchers have made significant contri-
butions to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of a broad spectrum of organi-
zations. Comparatively little work has been done to date, however, to apply logistics
methodologies to the supply chains associated with disaster response. Arguably some
of the most urgent challenges faced by our society include the development of effective
methods to prevent, mitigate, and respond to emergency situations caused by natural
or man-made disasters. Preparation for and response to disasters frequently require
the coordination of resources and personnel from local, regional, national, and inter-
national governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector,
and the affected population. As such, these challenges provide many opportunities
for supply chain management professionals to make valuable contributions.
Some organizations have been successful in responding to disasters, and closer
investigation of their practices helps move this field forward. Among those who are
well-recognized for their ability to respond is Waffle House Restaurants, and this
study aims to understand why this company has been successful. The chapter is
organized as follows. The research objectives, case study methodology, and selection
of Waffle House Restaurants as the emphasis of the study are described in Section
4.2; this section also provides a review of literature in this area. Section 4.3 describes
the philosophy, structure, and processes associated with Waffle House Restaurants’
hurricane response. An analysis of Waffle House Restaurants’ success in terms of
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supply chain and crisis management tools, the types of decision tradeoffs inherent
in disaster response, and lessons that translate to other organizations are detailed in
Section 4.4. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.5. The material from this
chapter has appeared in [29], and accompanying teaching materials are available [28].
4.2 Research Objectives and Methodology
This study is motivated by the impact of supply chain management methodologies
in the day-to-day business operations in the private sector and the opportunity to
improve their application in disaster response scenarios. It seeks to answer several
questions:
• Are there private sector organizations that succeed in responding to natural
disasters?
• Why is such an organization successful?
– What type of crisis management and supply chain management techniques
are used?
– What are the roles of the different functional groups of the organization in
the disaster response?
– How do the functional groups collaborate within the organization?
– How does the organization collaborate with other stakeholders?
• How can lessons from the experience of the organization be generalized to oth-
ers?
A case study approach was selected to investigate these research questions. As
described by Yin [107], the case study is a relevant research method when investiga-
tors seek to know how or why a phenomenon occurs, have little control over actual
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behavioral events, and are concerned with contemporary issues. Each of these char-
acteristics describes the research topic at hand. Case studies also provide concrete
examples of practical applications of management techniques, and thus, can help
other organizations develop ways to translate theory into practice. By presenting
this research as a case study, we pursue several important objectives. The study aims
to highlight the processes and decisions that make Waffle House Restaurants a leader
in hurricane response. Hence, while addressing the research questions posed, this
study also stimulates improved disaster preparedness in other organizations by rais-
ing critical issues in disaster preparedness and response. Finally, the case study lends
itself to the development of educational materials for use in academic and professional
training environments. Developing greater awareness and competence among supply
chain professionals is a critical step toward improving disaster response and the case
study approach helps achieve that goal.
After framing the research questions and selecting the case study methodology,
Waffle House Restaurants was selected as the focus of this study. The company began
with a single store in 1955, but now has restaurants in 26 states and a dense presence
in the Southeast region of the United States. This geographic presence makes the
stores vulnerable to the effects of hurricanes and has led the company to develop
nationally-recognized disaster response processes. Their proactive approach earned
them recognition from ABC News following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita for their
”rapid ability to provide relief in disaster,” alongside Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and
Lowe’s [44]. In contrast to these other companies, Waffle House Restaurants is pri-
vately owned. It does not have its own transportation fleet and has comparatively
fewer resources at its disposal, making internal and external collaboration a key com-
ponent of its success in hurricane response. Unlike other companies that participate
in humanitarian response, such as major global logistics firms United Parcel Service
(UPS) and TNT, logistics is not the primary business of Waffle House Restaurants.
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The company’s use of supply chain management tools in support of its response efforts
thus provides insights for others who strive to do the same.
4.2.1 Supply Chain Management and Disaster Response in the Literature
Standard supply chain management problems such as resource allocation, transporta-
tion planning, and inventory management all develop a new level of complexity in
the context of disaster response. Infrastructure and resource availability is uncertain,
and demand can vary widely both in volume and location. Decisions must often be
made very urgently and with limited information. In this context, there is a need for
complementary tools from both crisis management and supply chain management.
Before describing the ways that Waffle House Restaurants has dealt with some of
these challenges, we summarize previous work in these areas.
The classical text on crisis management is Weick and Sutcliffe’s Managing the
Unexpected [103], in which the authors examine a number of what they call high
reliability organizations, such as nuclear power plants, firefighting crews, and aircraft
carriers. These high reliability organizations face substantial risk of disastrous events
but routinely perform very well. From these successful organizations, five practices
are derived that are essential for others that seek to perform as well and manage
crises effectively. These practices include a preoccupation with failure, in which error
reporting is encouraged and even small problems addressed; a reluctance to simplify
interpretations so that all perspectives are considered; a sensitivity to operations,
with a focus on detailed workings of the organization as opposed only to strategy; a
commitment to resilience by building individuals’ capacities and returning to a state
of preparedness as soon as possible; and a deference to expertise, empowering those
who have experience in a needed area regardless of their rank.
Pearson et al [76] describe five phases of effective crisis management: crisis pre-
vention, preparedness, containment, recovery, and learning. Later, they emphasize
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the importance of a systems approach to crisis management: “If a company could
adapt already existing systemic approaches to include its crisis-management activi-
ties, then it might be more likely to address the crises proactively rather than after
the fact.” In addition to discussions of preparedness approaches that make use of spe-
cific plans, other researchers have examined characteristics that make organizations
inherently resilient and seek to measure this resilience potential [64, 87]. Somers [87]
demonstrates that resilience potential correlates with certain activities that can be
influenced by managers, such as organizational structure, participation in community
planning activities, and the extent to which management seeks information about
risks.
Given our focus on supply chain management tools within the context of disaster
response, the literature on supply chain disruption and risk management also provides
insights. Tang [89] provides a detailed survey of work in this area. He notes that the
majority of the existing models deal with operational risk rather than disruption risk,
and while many companies recognize the importance of risk assessment, few invest
time and resources to mitigate disruption risks. The author highlights several im-
portant open research areas to develop quantitative models that can help companies
better manage disruption risk. Of particular relevance to this case study are the con-
sideration of different objective functions and management targets (besides expected
cost), as well as strategies for demand, supply, and product management.
Tomlin [93] quantifies the value of mitigation and contingency strategies in the
face of supply-side disruption risks. The author derives optimal policies for a single-
product, two-supplier case in which one supplier is fully reliable and the other is
unreliable but less expensive. Inventory mitigation, supplier choice mitigation, and
contingent rerouting (by choosing another supplier) are examined. These theoretical
results provide insights for the kinds of policies that may be effective in practice.
Despite much work in the area of risk and uncertainty, research in the area of supply
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chain disruption as a result of disasters remains an important and growing field [57].
Several articles describe supply chain operations in the context of humanitarian
response. A detailed overview of the challenges of humanitarian logistics, in particu-
lar the interaction of many stakeholders, is provided by [97]. This study and a related
article [92] also highlight the opportunity for humanitarian agencies and private com-
panies to learn from one another to improve operations, emphasizing the successful
partnership between the World Food Programme and TNT. Others [12, 50] have ad-
dressed the important role that information management and dissemination play in
response efforts, while [9, 10] examine questions of inventory management in disaster
response supply chains. [60] describes improvements made in the FEMA procure-
ment system since Hurricane Katrina, including the use of both pre-positioning and
pre-negotiated contracts with suppliers of relief necessities. Despite the research that
has been done to date, [59] emphasizes the need for additional quantitative research
to support planning and processes for disaster response.
4.2.2 Waffle House Restaurants Hurricane Response
This case study differs from much of the previous literature in that it describes the
efforts of a particular private company, as opposed to a humanitarian agency, in
preparing for and responding to natural disasters. The study showcases the Waffle
House Restaurants hurricane response philosophy, the processes the company fol-
lows in preparing for and responding to hurricanes, and some of the lessons learned
throughout the years of response activities. The case study details the responsibilities
of the different functional groups of the company. It also describes ways that Waffle
House Restaurants have improved hurricane response processes as a result of lessons
learned from previous hurricanes.
This case study contributes to the literature in crisis management and human-
itarian logistics by providing concrete examples of effective techniques in practice.
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We relate the outcomes of our original research questions regarding the company’s
success to the underlying theoretical framework in these disciplines. We demonstrate
that Waffle House Restaurants exhibits several of the qualities of high reliability or-
ganizations and that the company has focused much effort on developing systematic
processes for the phases of effective crisis management. This case study illustrates
that planning for supply chain disruptions and using logistics methodologies, such as
supply and demand management and inventory planning, can contribute to effective
response in humanitarian crises. Finally, it provides lessons for companies in the pri-
vate sector as well as government and humanitarian agencies and raises questions for
future research in this area.
4.3 Case Description
Tom Forkner and Joe Rogers, Sr., opened the first Waffle House Restaurants store
with a commitment to outstanding service, both to their customers and to their
employees. This dedication to the community is still witnessed today, and perhaps
is most evident in the company’s philosophy toward hurricane response. In this case
study, we detail the company philosophy and describe their preparation for hurricane
season, their response process, and the lessons they have learned to improve the
process through the years.
4.3.1 Company Background
In 1955, the first Waffle House Restaurants store was opened in Avondale Estates,
outside of Atlanta, GA.1 More than 50 years later, it has grown to approximately
1600 stores in 26 states. 650 of these are owned and operated by franchisees, with
the remainder managed by the company itself. Waffle House Restaurants has various
1Company background was obtained through personal interviews with Waffle House Restaurants
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Figure 21: Waffle House, Inc., Organizational Structure.
offerings, including breakfast items, T-bone steaks, hamburgers, country ham, pork
chops, and grits.
Today, employees in stores across the country contribute to serving Good Food
Fast R© in Waffle House Restaurants open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The
company is headquartered in Norcross, GA, and the Southeast remains a large market.
Therefore, a significant percentage of Waffle House Restaurants are subject to the
effects of hurricanes. The company’s hurricane preparations involve employees from
all of the functional groups in the organization.
The specific roles of each group in the hurricane response process are detailed in
Section 4.3.4. To assist in understanding the relationship between the groups, Figure
21 illustrates the organizational structure of Waffle House Restaurants. There are
two major divisions of the company: operations and non-operations. The operations
division runs the company- and subsidiary-owned restaurants. Three unit managers,
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each responsible for one restaurant, report to each district manager, and three or four
district managers report to each division manager. The region/area vice presidents are
each responsible for three or four divisions, for a total of approximately 30 restaurants.
The region/area vice presidents report to eight senior vice presidents, who in turn
are responsible to three executive vice presidents. The final roles in the managerial
structure are those of the president and of the chairman and chief executive officer,
who have responsibilities for both operations and non-operations.
In the non-operations division, there are three primary areas. The chief financial
officer, the vice president of close support, and the vice president of development
each report to the president. The finance team is responsible for accounting, finance,
franchise development and support, tax, and stock tasks. Close support manages
marketing and communications, human resources and training, and operations con-
trol, which supports company operators. The development team is responsible for
real estate, construction, and equipment and property management.
4.3.2 Disaster Response Philosophy
The processes used by Waffle House Restaurants to respond to hurricanes have evolved
over the course of many years, but one fundamental theme directs all the response
activities. “Nothing good can come from a closed Waffle House after a hurricane - not
for us, not for the community, not for the associates.” This statement from former
Waffle House Restaurants president and chief operations officer, Bert Thornton, sum-
marizes the company’s disaster response philosophy. The company is committed to
getting back into the affected areas, opening stores as quickly as it is feasible and safe
to do so, and helping the local economy and restaurant associates rebuild. Despite
the fact that operating in these conditions presents significant economic and logistical
challenges, Mr. Thornton explains, “Our position is this: those customers and those
associates are there for us in the good times, so it’s our responsibility to be there
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when times are tough. We do not take a back seat; we don’t subscribe to the theory
that you just wait until everything is easy to do and then open up the doors. We’re
always the first ones in.”
Because of this commitment, the company’s reputation now precedes their arrival
into an affected area. The National Guard and local authorities welcome the arrival
of Waffle House Restaurants personnel, recognizing that they provide an essential
service in the form of hot meals for National Guard personnel, local emergency re-
sponders, electricians, and community members alike in the aftermath of a storm.
Waffle House Restaurants’ commitment and philosophy have informed the develop-
ment of an integrated hurricane response process. The effectiveness of the response
stems from proactive preparation and continuous improvement.
4.3.3 Hurricane Response Cycle
Preparation for hurricane response, for which the company dedicates significant time
and resources, is part of Waffle House Restaurants’ larger disaster planning. Prepa-
ration begins in the spring, prior to the beginning of the hurricane season. A major
weather event triggers the response systems, and lessons learned are documented for
future seasons.
Many years ago, hurricane efforts were a response task, but Waffle House Restau-
rants senior managers now consider them a response event. The change is reflected
in the number of people and resources that are dedicated to hurricane planning.
The leadership team is comprised of senior management from each of the company’s
functional areas, and the team participates both in the annual preparation meeting
and on-the-ground response. Many are 20- or 30-year veterans of the Waffle House
Restaurants business. Though the response processes are well-documented, director
of purchasing, Greg Rollings, explains, “They won’t be lost if they lose the checklist.”
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4.3.3.1 Pre-season Preparation
The Atlantic basin hurricane season officially extends from June 1 through November
30 [69]. To make a quick and effective response possible, the Waffle House Restaurants
hurricane response cycle begins with pre-season preparation. At the annual hurricane
preparation meeting each May, all members of the hurricane response team gather at
the corporate headquarters. Lessons learned from the prior season are reiterated, key
responsibilities are confirmed, contact information and procedures are updated, and
the response protocol and timeline are reviewed. In addition to the annual meeting
at headquarters, communication and training occur at all levels of the organization.
Associates at all restaurants receive information about how to prepare their homes
and families for an imminent hurricane, as well as how to contact the company to
confirm their safety and obtain information about returning to work.
Prior to the onset of hurricane season, response processes are also reviewed with
Waffle House Restaurants’ key vendors with whom the company interacts on a regular
basis. Arrangements are also made to obtain supplies specific to hurricane response,
including fuel and portable toilets. These items are critical because electricity and
water are often unavailable following a storm. At this time, other key assets includ-
ing generators, vehicles, and communications equipment are secured either through
purchase or lease agreements.
When Waffle House Restaurants reopen following a hurricane, they serve a limited
menu rather than the full normal selection. The items and prices for this hurricane
menu are determined prior to the hurricane season. These are filed with the appropri-
ate government authorities in each hurricane-prone state to document the restaurant’s
commitment to consumer protection practices. Prices are fixed to the current pre-
season value and the lowest applicable tax rate is used. The resulting values are then
rounded down to the nearest nickel to make it easier for associates to conduct trans-
actions if cash registers are not operational. The hurricane menu is used to simplify
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operations in the immediate aftermath of a storm and is discussed in more detail later
in Section 4.3.4.4.
4.3.3.2 Impending Storm Preparation
During hurricane season, weather in the region is monitored daily. If a landfall is
deemed likely at Category 3 strength or above [70], the hurricane response process is
initiated. The first step in the process is the designation of a commander-in-control.
This person, stationed at the corporate headquarters, is responsible for coordinating
all of the response activities.
When a storm is imminent, the purchasing group executes a number of actions to
prepare for store closure and reopening. In particular, the timing, destination, and
quantity of food deliveries must be managed with suppliers. In addition to coordinat-
ing the food supplies in the days leading up to landfall, the purchasing department
also secures recreational vehicles (RVs) and a refrigerator truck, as deemed necessary.
The RVs are used to transport and house Waffle House Restaurants personnel who
will enter the affected area immediately after the storm passes, while the truck is used
to transport supplies from stores that cannot or will not reopen immediately to those
that will. These vehicles are dispatched to staging locations closer to the storm area
in the day before landfall. Along with the dispatch of the RVs and the refrigerator
truck, the response teams from each of the functional areas are mobilized in the days
leading up to the storm.
4.3.3.3 Post-storm Action
Smaller hurricanes and tropical storms are handled on a case-by-case basis and may
be addressed by a smaller team or through the company’s standard crisis procedures.
However, for storms that are large Category 2 hurricanes or above and thus affect
a significant number of restaurants, the Waffle House Restaurants hurricane team
aims to have personnel in the affected area 12 hours after the storm has passed.
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These responders travel from their staging locations and immediately begin assessing
damage and implementing a recovery plan. Each functional group within the company
has specific responsibilities during the recovery, which are detailed in Section 4.3.4.
The recovery plan draws on the documented hurricane response procedures.
4.3.3.4 Return to Normalcy
Waffle House Restaurants is committed to speeding the return to normal operations
for the sake of its employees and the communities in which it operates. Depending
on the scope of the hurricane impact, this process may take less than a week or
more than a year. The company is able to reopen stores more quickly than many
other businesses because of their proactive approach developed over time. Lessons
learned in each storm are used to improve future preparedness. Many of the processes
outlined in the remainder of this case study are the result of experience in responding
to hurricanes throughout the years. The company responds more quickly, has more
resources dedicated to the response, and has identified what supplies and tasks are
critical to a successful recovery operation.
4.3.4 Functional Area Responsibilities
In this section we describe the responsibilities of each functional group in the days im-
mediately preceding and following a hurricane that affects company-managed stores.
The primary areas of responsibility include the Purchasing, Construction and Equip-
ment, Operations, People and Information Technology, and Control functions. The
response efforts are coordinated by a commander-in-control stationed at corporate
headquarters in Norcross, GA. Senior managers are involved in every step of the re-
sponse process and are among those that are on the ground immediately following
a storm. In the case of franchisees, corporate leaders make available any resources
requested, but the franchisees lead the response process.
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4.3.4.1 Commander-in-Control
Stationed at corporate headquarters, the commander-in-control communicates across
all functional groups and mobilizes corporate resources to meet the needs of the
personnel in the affected areas. This is a very intense responsibility, often requiring
18-hour work days. The company has identified a number of people with experience
in filling this position, and the person initially appointed to this role typically passes
the responsibility to another after the first several days of the recovery effort.
4.3.4.2 Purchasing
The purchasing group has developed a timeline to assist with the many tasks necessary
to prepare for and respond to a hurricane. Five days before the anticipated landfall,
communications with suppliers are critical to ensure that the suppliers have adequate
inventory of the emergency items (which are not part of typical orders) Waffle House
Restaurants will need. Items such as to-go supplies, paper towels, cleaning materials,
hand sanitizer, ice, bottled water, and canned drinks are all needed in much greater
quantities following a hurricane than under normal circumstances. Communicating
with suppliers is also critical so that they can begin planning for drivers and deliveries
of supplies immediately after the hurricane.
As landfall nears and the areas likely to be affected are more clearly identified,
suppliers are notified to suspend delivery to areas that are being evacuated. The
company’s primary supplier has ready access to hurricane-affected areas because it
also provides food for hospitals. However, other suppliers are often unable to mo-
bilize quickly following a storm. To remedy this, purchasing personnel alert other
suppliers in advance of an oncoming storm and stage extra product in restaurants
that are outside the storm path but near the affected markets. This enables Waffle
House Restaurants personnel to draw from these stocks to supply affected stores,
transporting the goods themselves until normal shipments from these suppliers can
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resume. For example, two days prior to expected landfall, the company’s bread sup-
plier makes its last deliveries to the affected area. In addition to the standard delivery,
the bread supplier delivers safety stock to stores that are out of the storm’s path but
nearby. This bread supplies the reopened stores in the days immediately following
the hurricane.
When a storm is imminent, purchasing personnel secure recreational vehicles
(RVs) to provide sleeping quarters for the teams arriving on the scene first. These
teams are staged in locations that will ensure their safety while still allowing quick
access to affected areas. For example, during a Gulf Coast hurricane, response teams
are staged to the east and west of the predicted storm path. This enables them to
enter the affected area as the storm pushes north.
Two days prior to projected landfall, the purchasing group also places an order
for the first truck containing “first-wave supplies”: ice, bottled water, canned soft
drinks, to-go supplies, and cleaning supplies. The contents of the first-wave truck
have been standardized based on experience in past hurricanes. This truck is staged
and ready to deliver supplies on the day after landfall as soon as the operations group
has determined which units will open first.
The first restaurants that are opened are able to operate with the supplies from
the first-wave truck, their remaining food, and items recovered from surrounding
restaurants. As additional restaurants are identified for opening, the second wave of
supplies is ordered. Until recently, when a store was identified for reopening immedi-
ately following a hurricane, each restaurant manager was responsible for determining
the food and supplies that were necessary. In the chaos, this frequently led to a
mismatch between orders and requirements. After Hurricane Ivan in 2004, purchas-
ing personnel developed a hurricane inventory sheet with a par level for each item.
This tool enables managers to assess their current inventory levels and order up to
the par level for each item. Standardizing this process has improved Waffle House
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Restaurants’ ability to effectively open and operate stores quickly after a storm.
In addition to managing food and restaurant supplies, the purchasing group se-
cures a refrigerator truck and RVs for use in the response effort. The truck is used
to transport food from nearby restaurants to those that are selected to reopen first.
The RVs provide mobile control centers as well as housing for response personnel.
4.3.4.3 Construction and Equipment
The construction group has two primary responsibilities in the immediate aftermath
of a hurricane: assess damage to all affected restaurants and manage refueling for
all on-location responders. To execute these tasks, this group interfaces with several
other functional areas before and after the storm. Prior to hurricane season, the
construction and purchasing groups ensure that RVs are available to serve as sleeping
quarters for response personnel and as command centers for the response. Following
a storm, construction leaders work with operations managers to determine which
stores can be reopened and in what order. These decisions are based on the physical
condition of the restaurants; the availability of staff, food, and supplies; proximity
to other restaurants; and proximity to major transportation routes. The equipment
group is closely involved in these tasks, as well, arranging for generators and other
equipment necessary to reopen restaurants.
Supplies of fuel are scarce and demand is high following a major hurricane. Fre-
quently, Waffle House Restaurants must rely on generators to operate restaurants
until electricity is restored. In addition, the response teams must travel between all
the restaurants in the affected area so fuel for vehicles is a necessity. The company
has developed processes to obtain fuel by establishing relationships with suppliers in
the pre-season and making arrangements when storms are imminent. This is a joint
responsibility of the construction and purchasing teams.
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4.3.4.4 Operations
On a day-to-day basis, the operations group is responsible for running the restaurants.
Following a hurricane, operations personnel work with the construction group to
identify which restaurants to reopen and in what order. They are also responsible for
the on-site tasks that are necessary for operating the stores, such as food preparation,
customer service, and cleaning.
Until Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Waffle House Restaurants that were reopened in the
aftermath of a hurricane offered the same menu as they did under normal operations.
But this poses a challenge in post-hurricane conditions, especially for made-to-order
breakfast items. Waffle House Restaurants president and chief operations officer, Bert
Thornton, explains the advent of the hurricane menu:
I was standing in the middle of it and listening to people call out or-
ders like, “Let me have an order over-medium plate scattered, smothered,
covered, chunked, diced, topped, peppered, and capped,” and our people
were going nuts. So I actually got up on a chair and I said, “Ladies and
gentlemen, I’ve got good news and bad news for you. The good news is ev-
erybody’s gonna get fed. The bad news is -,” because I had hand-written
on several pieces of paper for each salesperson - I said, “Your salesperson
will show you what you can order. . . . it’s a limited menu. You can have
anything you want; now here’s the list of things that you’re gonna want.”
Since then, the hurricane menu has changed as Waffle House Restaurants personnel
observed what worked well and what did not. For example, bacon is not available
in a post-hurricane situation because it takes up a lot of valuable grill space and
requires long cooking times. However, ham was added because it is fast. The decision
about what to offer on the hurricane menu requires a consideration of the space and
time available for cooking, both of which are at a premium in the aftermath of a
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storm. Waffle House Restaurants are typically the first, and often remain the only,
restaurants open for some time after a major hurricane. Law enforcement, emergency
responders, and local citizens are anxious for a hot meal. While they are grateful for
any food, customers do have preferences and menu diversity is important. Choosing
the menu items becomes a balance between resource availability and customer utility.
The hurricane menu does not differ significantly from the normal menu, but it is a
combination of what people want most and what is easiest to prepare.
4.3.4.5 People and Information Technology
The people group has a number of important tasks following a hurricane. First and
foremost, all employees must be accounted for. Prior to hurricane season, all asso-
ciates are provided with a key chain attachment that is printed with a phone number
to call to confirm their own location and the status of their restaurant. Working with
operations and construction personnel, the people group helps redeploy associates to
the stores that will be reopened first. If an employee is available, but his or her home
restaurant has not yet reopened, that associate often works in a nearby restaurant
until the home restaurant comes back online. The people group also works with the
control group to manage payroll processes in the days following a hurricane.
At the onset of a response, at least one person in the people group must also
secure hotel rooms for the response personnel and displaced associates. This is a
difficult task given the high demand for rooms. To help address this issue, Waffle
House Restaurants purchased a recreational vehicle (RV) following the 2005 hurri-
cane season. The RV is outfitted with satellite capability to support internet and
phone communications. This helps alleviate another challenge that arises in large-
scale hurricane response - communications among people in the affected area as well
as with the corporate headquarters. Because cellular and landline phone service are
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frequently unavailable in the aftermath of a storm, satellite capabilities greatly sim-
plify communications.
Information technology personnel are tasked with addressing hardware issues and
securing any necessary replacement parts. They also assist with the shutdown and
restart processes for restaurant computer systems. Finally, a corporate psychologist
plays a vital role in response efforts and is available both to local associates and to
responders.
4.3.4.6 Control
The control function has two primary challenges in the aftermath of a hurricane. The
first is accounting for food that was already in restaurants prior to the storm. As part
of the closing process, most food at each restaurant is stored in the freezer, where
it stays frozen for a short period even if electricity is lost. If a store is chosen for
immediate reopening, this food is still available for use. However, if the store cannot
be reopened, the food may be transferred via refrigerator truck to another restaurant.
The control group is tasked with tracking this movement of food to help maintain
inventory accuracy for each store. The second challenge faced by the control group is
administering payroll. Waffle House Restaurants pays hourly associates every Sunday
and wages are paid in cash. Following a hurricane, banks are often closed, so cash
must be brought in from outside the affected area.
4.4 Case Analysis
Having examined the hurricane response processes used by Waffle House Restaurants,
we now analyze these practices in light of the original research objectives. This
analysis includes a description of the tools used by the company, a discussion of
decision tradeoffs and collaborative efforts, and a summary of lessons to assist other
organizations.
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4.4.1 Tools for Success
The discussion of Waffle House Restaurants’ hurricane response processes provides an
affirmative answer to the first question posed by this study, which sought to determine
whether there are private sector organizations that succeed in responding to natural
disasters. The company’s success is measured in terms of the time to reach the
affected area, the time to return stores to operation, and the ability to put people
back to work.
Reports from local and national news media attest to the results that the Waffle
House Restaurants hurricane response process achieved, specifically in the wake of the
devastating 2005 season. From Mississippi, where two restaurants sustained damage
and seven others were completely destroyed by Hurricane Katrina: “Waffle House is
rebuilding along decimated U.S. 90 with an efficiency apparently matched only by the
casino industry” [37]. The Pascagoula, Mississippi, location was reopened less than
three days after Hurricane Katrina raged through the area. A restaurant industry
professional reporting for a trade magazine stated, “A veteran of restaurant openings,
I did not expect the event to be so momentous. But that Waffle House, by opening its
doors, assured the community that there was a chance life could return to normal. It
provided comfort and a sense of home amid unfathomable devastation” [84]. Reports
from Port Arthur, Texas, in the days after Hurricane Rita carried a similar theme:
“Since the hurricane came ashore, very few people in Southeast Texas have been
able to enjoy the restaurant experience, mainly because there’s no restaurant open
to experience . . . The Waffle House . . . was among the first restaurants to open in a
storm-ravaged city that’s thirsting for electricity” [53].
While these news articles illustrate the results, they do not highlight the crisis and
supply chain management tools the company uses to achieve them. Examining the
steps of the company’s hurricane response cycle, however, reveals many of Weick and
Sutcliffe’s [103] practices for high reliability organizations in action. The continuous
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learning approach helps address even small problems in hurricane preparedness so
that larger failures do not result. Waffle House Restaurants is certainly an organiza-
tion that is sensitive to operations. Senior management team members started their
Waffle House Restaurants careers in the kitchen and the hurricane plans reflect the
detailed on-the-ground approach. The company measures its effectiveness by how
quickly it is able to return to normal operations, demonstrating the commitment to
resilience. As evidence of the practice of deferring to expertise, the people on-site
have the authority to make decisions regarding the response effort with little need for
information to travel up long chains of command that can hinder decision making in
larger organizations.
We also see that each of the five phases of effective crisis management described
in [76], namely crisis prevention, preparedness, containment, recovery, and learning,
are represented in the Waffle House Restaurants’ hurricane response cycle. While
the extent of crisis prevention and containment are limited in the case of hurricanes,
these do play a role as restaurant locations ready their buildings and personnel for
anticipated storms. Much of the company’s success stems from preparedness and
learning, both of which enable more efficient recovery. Observations of Waffle House
Restaurants hurricane response process provide empirical confirmation of Somers’ [87]
findings that such activities are correlated with resilience potential.
Supply chain management tools have been implemented as Waffle House Restau-
rants’ personnel learned from hurricanes over time. Examples include pre-negotiated
contracts and agreements with suppliers, inventory pre-positioning plans, procure-
ment strategies, and inventory management tools such as par level policies. One
challenge that the company faces is that it does not own its own transportation fleet.
Waffle House Restaurants have addressed this by building strong relationships with
suppliers and by renting refrigerator trucks to help transport supplies after hurri-
canes. Waffle House Restaurants must also take into account the perishable nature of
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its inventory in its hurricane supply plans and inventory management. These practices
illustrate the kinds of disruption risk management theories described in [89, 93], which
enable Waffle House Restaurants to succeed in effectively responding to hurricanes.
4.4.2 Decision Tradeoffs
There are several decisions that must be made before or during a hurricane response
that highlight the tradeoffs faced by functional groups within a single organization or
multiple stakeholders in a collaborative response. This case discusses many interac-
tions between functional groups and highlights collaboration between Waffle House
Restaurants, its suppliers, the National Guard, and other stakeholders during a hurri-
cane response. To illustrate the decision processes involved in such relationships and
describe the collaborative activities in the Waffle House Restaurants response plan,
we consider two decisions that involve tradeoffs: the choices of hurricane menu items
and store reopening.
The choice of items on the hurricane menu highlights the tradeoffs between cus-
tomer satisfaction and efficient operation with limited resources. Customer preference
and the time and space required for food preparation are important factors in the
menu decision, particularly from the perspective of the operations functional group.
From the perspective of the purchasing group, supplier relationships and capability to
sustain deliveries also impact menu choices. However, from the control perspective,
the storage and refrigeration requirements and item shelf life impact this decision.
The choice of menu items impacts suppliers as well. Waffle House Restaurants have
managed this relationship by establishing clear communication processes with suppli-
ers and an ordering timeline for items that are specific to hurricane response, including
greater quantities of ham and canned beverages instead of fountain supplies. Limited
resources may require reduced offerings of goods or services across most organiza-
tions, but the best ways to manage this depend on the objectives and functions of
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the organization.
Many factors also affect a store reopening decision. Proximity to a major roadway
or airport are positive factors from the operations standpoint for ease of customer
access, from the perspective of construction and equipment personnel who need to
supply gasoline for generators, and for the purchasing group to ensure that supplies
can get in quickly. The current inventory levels at the candidate stores and their
location with respect to other stores from which inventory can be transferred are
important factors. If one store has electricity and the other does not, this has a
strong influence on the reopening decision. If generators or food supplies are scarce,
the order of importance of the factors can also change.
4.4.3 Generalizing Lessons Learned
Waffle House Restaurants has learned from years of experience responding to hur-
ricanes that impacted their locations. Other organizations can benefit from these
lessons, including the need for well-documented processes and continuous updating
based on new experiences. The hurricane response process is a good illustration of
the phases of crisis management. Adopting a critical supply chain management com-
ponent, the company has developed relationships with suppliers to help accomplish
its goal of reopening stores as quickly as possible. Ideas such as the hurricane menu
and the hurricane inventory sheets with par levels are transferable to other organiza-
tions that must make decisions about the breadth of goods and services to offer in a
disaster’s aftermath and on their inventory strategies. Pre-positioning inventory and
drawing from nearby stores that are unable to open has also improved Waffle House
Restaurants’ response efforts and could be reapplied in other industries, government
agencies [60], or NGOs. Perhaps most importantly, Waffle House Restaurants has
a proactive mentality that extends through all levels of the organization, stemming
from the company’s founding philosophy to focus on the well-being of their employees
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and customers.
The private sector, governmental agencies, and non-governmental organizations
can learn from the application of crisis and supply chain management methodologies
in the example of Waffle House Restaurants. Key take-away messages for others
seeking to improve their effectiveness are to develop the practices described by Weick
and Sutcliffe [103], to understand the important phases of crisis management [76], and
to implement supply chain management principles with the awareness that planning
for the disruption risks posed by disaster response may require different models than
day-to-day supply chain practices.
4.5 Conclusions and Future Research
Waffle House Restaurants’ hurricane response processes have developed over decades
of experience. The company’s commitment to its associates and to the communities
in which they operate has driven the continuous improvement in these processes.
Each functional area of the organization has clear responsibilities and plays a key role
in enabling quick recovery following even a major event such as Hurricane Katrina.
As a result, Waffle House Restaurants have earned recognition as a leader in disaster
relief. The lessons learned continue to shape the future of Waffle House Restaurants
and provide insight for other organizations to further develop their own response
capabilities.
This exploratory case study aimed to identify a private sector organization that
succeeds in disaster response, describe the crisis and supply chain management tools
it employs, understand the roles of functional groups and collaboration in the orga-
nization’s processes, and extend lessons to other organizations. The results of this
study raise several questions for future research. Additional studies should be done to
determine whether organizations that employ similar crisis and supply chain manage-
ment practices meet with similar success in disaster response. Comparisons can be
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made between U.S. and international organizations, as well as between private sector,
government, and non-governmental organizations. The development of supply chain
management models and tools that can further improve disaster response, especially
those that enable organizations to assess risk, resilience, and response approaches
quantitatively, is also an important area of future research.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
The challenges inherent in providing goods and services to those affected by humani-
tarian and public health emergencies require advanced logistics solutions. This thesis
adds to the understanding of decentralized networks and the methods used to study
them, particularly in the humanitarian context, and characterizes qualities of a suc-
cessful disaster response supply chain. Studying these supply chains contributes to
theory and practice in ways that can also benefit other application domains. The
work of this thesis leads to a number of future research avenues, some of which we
summarize here.
The contributions of this thesis point to opportunities for future work on the
theory of decentralized systems. We proved that an equilibrium solution to the prob-
lem introduced in Chapter 2 can be found efficiently. However, there are frequently
multiple equilibria in the system. Developing methods for finding, characterizing the
performance of, and improving the set of equilibrium solutions remains a potentially
fruitful area of research. We briefly discuss a computational approach for finding the
best or worst equilibrium solution in Appendix B, but understanding the theoretical
properties of the set of equilibrium solutions in a variety of network structures could
lead to improved methods of managing decentralized systems. Furthermore, work in
this area may build upon the idea of equilibrium-obtaining congestion weight vectors,
which guarantee that the central optimal solution is one possible equilibrium, and
lead to the development of robust mechanisms under which no equilibrium solution
performs too poorly.
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In the decentralized systems described in this thesis, individuals make choices
among facilities based on objectives that incorporate travel time, congestion, and
facility-specific weights on congestion. Additional individual objectives, and the re-
sulting decentralized system performance, are of interest for future research. Differ-
ent functional forms as well as individual-specific objective parameters may be useful
for modeling other scenarios arising in practice. Eliciting individual choice patterns
through case studies of actual systems or behavioral surveys could provide further
insight to incorporate into the decentralized models. This line of research may lead
to the design of additional mechanisms, akin to the equilibrium-obtaining congestion
weight vectors, that can improve decentralized system performance.
The first and second parts of the thesis considered decentralized logistics systems
in which facility locations were fixed and pre-specified. In practice, many organi-
zations face choices about facility location and capacity, whether in the design of
new logistics systems or when expanding existing ones. Most current facility location
models adopt a centralized perspective or, if individual decisions are considered, as-
sume that distance is the primary criterion. Expanding the decentralized modeling
framework described in this thesis to include facility location and capacity decisions,
therefore, is an important area of future research. As one example, this approach
could be used to design a distribution system such as the one discussed in Chapter 3
in a way that minimizes inequities in access.
Immediate next steps related to the study of accessibility and equity were de-
scribed in Chapter 3 and include the expansion of the study to the Southeast region
of the United States, to additional regions, and to a product specifically intended for
children. This work will facilitate comparison between regions and lead to policy rec-
ommendations that take into account specific features of different areas. Additional
future work in this area could examine dynamics in the system over time. The current
approach uses the entire quantity of product available during the shortage period, but
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shipments to service locations actually took place over time. The distribution process
also continued beyond the shortage period. Incorporating the temporal aspect of the
problem and examining the differences between the shortage and surplus phases may
provide additional information for improving future distribution efforts.
The third part of this thesis examined Waffle House Restaurants’ successful hur-
ricane response efforts. This study highlighted the practices of a single organization,
but in many humanitarian contexts multiple agencies interact. Further studies could
characterize effective collaborations between organizations in practice and develop




PROOFS OF CHAPTER 2 RESULTS
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof consists of two parts. We first demonstrate the
lower bound by providing a network structure for which the lower bound is tight for
any value of αmax ≥ 1. We then prove the upper bound.
Consider the network illustrated in Figure 2, in which the number of customers,
n, is equal to the number of facilities, m. The distance from each customer to the
facility located in the clockwise direction is 0, while that to the facility in the counter-
clockwise direction is αmax. The congestion weight associated with each facility is
αmax. The optimal solution is shown on the left; all users travel in a clockwise direction
and the total cost is n. The cost perceived by each individual is αmax. However, the
solution on the right is also an equilibrium solution in which each user incurs travel
time αmax and congestion 1, resulting in a total cost of nαmax + n. This solution is
an equilibrium, because the cost perceived at the current solution for each individual
is equal to the perceived cost of switching: 2αmax. Therefore, for networks with this
structure for any n = m, we have
Price of Anarchy =
nαmax + n
n
= αmax + 1,
providing a tight lower bound on the price of anarchy.
We now prove the upper bound. Consider an equilibrium solution x and a central
optimal solution x∗. Let dij be the distance from customer i to facility j, I(j) the set
of customers served at j in the equilibrium solution, I∗(j) the set of customers served
at j in the central optimal solution, and xj and x
∗
j the cardinality of I(j) and I
∗(j),




















The equilibrium solution x satisfies the Equilibrium Condition for each customer i,
which is given by diji + αjixji ≤ dij∗i + αj∗i (xj∗i + 1). Here ji is the facility at which
i is served in the equilibrium solution and j∗i that in the central optimal solution.
Aggregating this expression over all customers i, we obtain∑
i




dij∗i + αj∗i (xj∗i + 1)
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. (51)
























































since αmax ≥ αj ≥ 1 for all j. The expression in parentheses on the right of (54) is




















Note that the expression in parentheses on the right is the cost of the central
optimal solution, so all that remains is to relate the expression on the left of (55) to
the true cost of the equilibrium solution. That is straightforward since αj ≥ 1 for all






























Proof of Lemma 1. First observe that only the congestion at facilities j and k and
the travel time of customer i are changed by this move. In solution x, these values
are given by
(xj + 1)
2 + x2k + dij.
Similarly, following i’s move, the relevant congestion and travel time terms become
x2j + (xk + 1)
2 + dik.
Expanding terms and subtracting the cost in the original solution from the cost after












= 2xk − 2xj + dik − dij.2









for at least one k. In words, x̄ satisfies i’s Equilibrium Condition when α = 0 but not








for all j 6= k. In words, x̃ differs from x̄ only in the assignment of customer i, and x̃
satisfies i’s Equilibrium Condition when α = 1 but may or may not satisfy it when



























Using the notation of Lemma 1, let x̄j be the total number of customers at j in
solution x̄ excluding i. Similarly, let x̄k be the total number of customers at k. Then
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dij−dik+x̄j−x̄k > 0 because x̄ does not satisfy i’s Equilibrium Condition when α = 1.
Since dij ≤ dik, this implies that x̄j > x̄k. Together, these two inequalities imply that
2x̄k−2x̄j +dik−dij < 0. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, this expression is precisely
the difference in system cost between x̄ and x̃, proving that moving customer i from
facility j to facility k results in a net decrease in system cost. 2
Proof of Theorem 6. The proof consists of two parts. First, we begin at an
arbitrary equilibrium solution under the α = 0 framework and move customers one
by one (possibly moving a customer more than once) such that the current move
satisfies that customer’s Equilibrium Condition under the α = 1 framework. We
show that the cumulative change in system cost that results from these moves is
strictly negative. Second, we show that this iterative process reaches an equilibrium
solution under the latter framework in a pseudo-polynomial number of steps under
the assumption that travel times and α values are rational numbers.




xij for each j.
Consider an arbitrary customer i and the sequence of iterations q = 0, 1, 2, ..., Q in
which i is the customer that is moved. (Note that any number of moves may occur by
other customers between consecutive moves by i.) Let xqj be the number of customers
at facility j in i’s qth iteration, for all j and for q = 0, 1, 2, ..., Q. Let oq be the
facility at which i is served prior to move q and dq be that after the move. From the




+ did0 − dio0 < 0, or equivalently, x0o0 − x
0
d0
+ dio0 − did0 > 0. (57)
From Lemma 2, we also know that i’s first move improves the system cost, with the




+ dio0 − did0 > 0. (58)
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Furthermore, we know from the Equilibrium Condition with α = 1 that
xqdq − x
q
oq + didq − dioq < 0 (59)






oq + didq − dioq) < 0. (60)
Since dioq = didq−1 , travel time terms cancel except for those to the first and last





















where the leftmost inequality follows from (57), the middle inequality from the fact
that we started from an equilibrium solution under α = 0 implying that do0 ≤ ddQ ,
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oq) + didQ − did0 − (x
0
o0
− x0d0 + dio0 − did0)
)
< 0, (64)
where the first group of terms is less than 0 from (62) and the second from (63).
















From Lemma 1, we see that the group of terms on the right gives the change in
system cost as a result of i’s first move while that on the left is the cumulative change
resulting from moves 1, 2, ..., Q. Since this cumulative change is strictly negative, we
have shown that the system cost decreases as a result of a sequence of moves by an
arbitrary customer, without regard to the moves by other customers. Since this is
true for each customer, it follows that the system cost decreases as a result of the
combined moves of all customers. All that remains to be shown is that iteratively
moving customers from an equilibrium solution under the α = 0 framework will
achieve an equilibrium solution under the α = 1 framework.
To prove this, we rely on knowledge of properties of the potential function of
congestion games described by Rosenthal [79]. He showed that every minima of the
potential function is a Nash equilibrium (in our terms, an equilibrium under α = 1).
Moreover, every selfish move by any customer results in a decrease in the potential
function (even if the system objective increases). In fact, the decrease in the potential
function is equal to the decrease that customer achieves in his own objective function.
Since the potential function is non-negative and since it strictly decreases with every
selfish move by every customer, we will certainly reach a potential function minima
and thus an equilibrium solution under the α = 1 framework by iteratively moving
from any equilibrium solution under the α = 0 framework in this way. Note that we
may reach an equilibrium under α = 1 before we find a potential function minima;
all minima are equilibrium solutions under α = 1 but the converse is not true. To see
that the process requires a pseudo-polynomial number of moves when travel times
and α values are rational, observe that multiplying all arc costs by the same suitably
large number in both the original and minimum cost flow networks from Theorem 1
preserves the potential function transformation. After this scaling, every selfish move
decreases the potential function value by at least 1, so the number of moves needed
to reach the potential function minimum is pseudo-polynomial.
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Finally, since we start at an arbitrary equilibrium solution x(α = 0) under the α =
0 framework and find an equilibrium solution x(α = 1) under the α = 1 framework
with no greater cost, the result holds when we start at x∗(α = 0), the equilibrium
solution under the former framework with lowest total system cost. Thus
z∗(α = 1) ≤ z(α = 1) ≤ z∗(α = 0).2
Proof of Theorem 7. Clearly the 0 vector is a feasible solution to D′. It remains to
be shown that this is a unique solution. For contradiction, suppose there is a feasible
solution y′ with at least one component strictly greater than 0.
Divide the jth constraint of D′ (6) by x∗j and introduce surplus variable sj to








yjk + sj = 0 ∀ j. (66)
Note that each sj ≤ 0 in any feasible solution since the original constraints (6) are all
greater than or equal to 0. Let λj =
x∗j
x∗j +1
and note that λj < 1 for all j. Aggregating












sj = 0. (67)





(λj − 1)yjk +
∑
j
sj = 0. (68)
Now since λj < 1 and ykj ≥ 0, we know that the term on the left is less than or
equal to zero, with equality only possible when ykj = 0 for all j, k. This implies that∑
j sj ≥ 0 and that if any ykj > 0, then
∑
j sj > 0. However, our proposed solution
y′, with at least one non-zero component, clearly violates the original dual constraints
since sj ≤ 0 in all feasible dual solutions. This contradiction implies that the unique
feasible solution to D′ has ykj = 0 for all k, j.
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Since the dual problem D′ is both feasible and bounded, the primal problem P ′
always has a feasible solution. 2
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we show
that there are no negative cost cycles consisting of original dual nodes and arcs. In
the second part, we prove that even if there is a negative cost cycle when flow loss
factors are included, such a cycle is not included in any most-negative S − T path in
the dual network.
First we examine the dual network without considering flow loss factors. For
contradiction, assume there exists a negative cost cycle consisting of c original dual
nodes and arcs. Without loss of generality, let these be nodes numbered 1, . . . , c. The
sum of the arc costs on this path is given by C = D12 +D23 + . . .+Dc−1,c +Dc1, which
is assumed to be negative. Recall that Dkj = dik− dij for some individual i served at
facility j in the central optimal solution. This implies that C = di121 − di122 + di232 −
di233 + . . . + dic−1,cc−1 − dic−1,cc + dic1c − dic11 < 0, where ijk represents the individual
from which the value Djk is obtained. In each case, this individual is currently served
at facility k. Observe, however, that the expression C also represents the net change
in travel time incurred when every individual ijk switches to facility j. The total
system congestion is unchanged by this switch since one individual is removed and
another added at each facility. Since C < 0, the proposed switch results in a decrease
in the cost of the central optimal solution and contradicts its optimality. Therefore,
no negative cost cycles exist if flow losses are ignored.
We will now show that, despite the existence of negative cost cycles when flow loss
factors are included, such a cycle is not part of any most-negative S − T path in the
dual network. For contradiction, assume there exists a negative cost cycle consisting
of c original dual nodes and arcs when flow loss factors are included. Without loss of
generality, let these be nodes numbered 1, . . . , c. Furthermore, assume that this cycle
is part of a most-negative S − T path, that is, (S, 1, . . . , c, 1, T ) is the most negative
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path connecting the source, S, to the sink, T. We have just shown that
D12 + D23 + . . . + Dc−1,c + Dc1 ≥ 0. (69)
Recall that arcs leading from the source to each facility node and from each facility
node to the sink all have cost 0. The total cost of the S − T path is then given by
the total cost of the cycle, which is assumed to be negative when flow losses are
considered:






λjDc1 < 0. (70)
Moreover, since this is assumed to be the most negative S−T path, every subpath
in the cycle that terminates at node 1 must also have negative cost when flow losses
are considered. (Otherwise, going directly to the sink would result in lower cost.)
This observation is represented mathematically as follows:






λjDc1 < 0 (71)






λjDc1 < 0 (72)
. . . (73)
c∏
j=2
λjDc1 < 0 (74)
Recall that 0 < λj < 1 for all j. Factoring out the common λj terms from each of

























. . . (77)
c∏
j=2
λj (Dc1) < 0 (78)
Combining all of these observations, we obtain:
0 > D12 + λ2
(









> D12 + D23 + λ3
(









. . . (81)
> D12 + D23 + D34 + . . . + λc−1 (Dc−1,c + λcDc1) > D12 + D23 + D34 + . . . + Dc−1,c + λcDc1(82)
> D12 + D23 + D34 + . . . + Dc−1,c + Dc1 ≥ 0, (83)
where the first inequality follows from (70), the intermediate inequalities from (75)-
(78) and the fact that λj’s are between 0 and 1, and the final inequality from (69).
However, this is clearly a contradiction. Therefore, the proposed negative cycle can
never be a most-negative S − T path. 2
Proof of Theorem 10. We know that primal optimal value is equal to the value of





To bound the dual optimal value, we introduce two definitions. Let Dmin = mink,j{Dkj}
and let λmax = maxj{
x∗j
x∗j +1















Shortest Path Bound Tight Example
Figure 22: Tight Example for Single α Bound.
arc on which there is the smallest loss of flow, respectively. The maximum number
of arcs with non-zero cost in an S − T path is m− 1 due to Lemma 4. Together, this
information implies the following bound on the minimum cost S − T path:







Substituting the expression for the sum of a geometric series gives an exact ex-













By combining this path cost with the original flow value on the path and dividing










A tight example can be constructed for any number of facilities, m, as illustrated
in Figure 22. Suppose, without loss of generality, that we seek the minimum feasible
value of α1. An S−1− . . .−T path that visits all facilities, with a cost of Dmin on all
original network arcs and a loss factor of λmax on the first m− 2 such arcs, achieves
the bound. 2
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Proof of Theorem 11. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 10. In this case,
the value of the minimum cost circulation is given by the sum of the values of the
shortest paths associated with each facility. This observation follows from Theorem
9 and from the fact that there are no upper bounds on flow along the original dual
arcs. As a result, flow along arc (S, j) continues along the shortest path from j to T
for each j and the minimum cost circulation is simply a composite of m flows along
the respective shortest paths. We will again bound the primal optimal value using
information about the dual problem.













Here pjmin denotes the shortest path in the dual network connecting facility j to T and
Cjpmin its cost. Define λmin = minj{
x∗j
x∗j +1
}. Examining the dual optimal expression on























where the final inequality follows from the facts that Cjpmin ≤ 0 and (1 − λj) ≤
(1− λmin) for all j.
We next bound the sum of the shortest path costs. As in the proof of Theorem 10,
let λmax = maxj{
x∗j
x∗j +1
} and Dmin = mink,j{Dkj}. These values capture the arc with
least cost and the arc on which there is the smallest loss of flow, respectively. The
fundamental idea of the proof of Theorem 10 is to bound the value of a single path
with the most negative arc costs, the greatest number of arcs, and the least flow loss.
Recall, however, that this bounding path visits each facility. By basic properties of
shortest paths, the part of this bounding path that connects a particular facility, j, to
T is also a shortest path from j to T . The sum of the costs of all shortest paths can




























































Finally, combining all of these facts and dividing by -1 to isolate the sum of the
































A network analogous to that in Figure 22, with additional arcs (S, j) for all j and
λmin = λmax, demonstrates that this bound is tight. 2
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
This appendix contains supplementary material describing our early research results
on the topics described in Chapter 2.
B.1 Some Special Cases of the Decentralized Problem
This section describes several results for specific cases of the Facility-Specific Con-
gestion Weights Problem. We first present a description of networks for which we
have proven that the price of anarchy is equal to 2 when αj = 1 for all j. These are
followed by results for special network structures in the case that congestion weights
αj are 0 for all facilities j.
B.1.1 When Congestion Weights Equal 1 for All Facilities
Recall from Corollary 2 that the price of anarchy when αj = 1 for all j is at least
2. There are a number of special cases for which the price of anarchy is exactly 2.
Before presenting these cases, we prove a useful relationship between central optimal
solution and decentralized solutions with α’s equal to 1.
Lemma 5 Let dij be the distance from customer i to facility j, I(j) the set of cus-
tomers served at j in a decentralized solution with αj = 1 for all j, I
∗(j) the set of
customers served at j in the central optimal solution, and xj and x
∗
j the cardinality

































Proof: Begin by considering the Equilibrium Condition for each customer i. This
can be written as
diji + xji ≤ dij∗i + xj∗i + 1,
where ji is the facility at which i is served in the decentralized solution and j
∗
i that
in the central optimal solution. Aggregating this expression over all customers i, we
obtain ∑
i




dij∗i + xj∗i + 1
)
.

































The expression on the left gives the total system cost of the decentralized solution,
































Lemma 6 Let xj =
∑n
i=1 xij for each j, the total congestion at facility j in a de-






ij for each j,
the total congestion at facility j in the central optimal solution. If xj = x
∗
j for every




Proof: We make use of the result in Lemma 5. Substituting xj = x
∗
j for all j into
































2 Moreover, the network in Figure 2 with αj = 1 for all j shows that the bound is
tight. 2
Lemma 7 If the central optimal solution splits customers equally between facilities,
that is, if x∗j =
n
m


















j and to substitute this
value into the expression from Lemma 5. Letting x∗j =
n
m




















The middle inequality holds whenever m ≤ n, which must be the case since each
facility has exactly n
m
customers and customers are integers. Again, the network in
Figure 2 shows that the bound is tight. 2
Lemma 8 If m = 2 and n = 2, that is, if there are exactly two facilities and two






















1 + x1 ∗+x2x∗2 + x2 ∗ .















2 − nx∗1 − nx1 + n + 2x1x∗1.
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Using the result of Lemma 5, if the following relationship holds then we will immedi-





























1 + (n− x∗1)2
 .
We wish to know, then, for which values of x1 and x
∗















1 + (n− x∗1)2
 .










2 + nx1 − 3nx∗1 − 2x1x∗1 − n.
Since n = 2, x1 and x
∗
1 can each take on the values 0, 1, or 2. Enumerating all nine
cases shows that the inequality holds for all possible values, and again the network




when n = m = 2. 2
We have shown for several special cases that the price of anarchy when αj = 1 for
all j is 2. We further conjecture that this is the worst-case bound on the performance
of decentralized system in this case for general network structures.
B.1.2 When Congestion Weights Equal 0 for All Facilities
We first examine the case in which the customers are in a single location and all
facilities are equidistant from that location. Suppose we have chosen to locate m
facilities and that the travel time from the customer location A to each facility is
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represented by d. We wish develop closed-form expressions for the cost of a centralized
solution in which a central planner assigns customers to the facilities. The cost of a
solution is again given by the sum of the total travel time and the total congestion
experienced by all customers in the system. The objective of the central planner is
to minimize this cost, and the minimum cost can be expressed as follows.
Theorem 12 The cost of the optimal assignment of n customers, all of whom are
located at A, to m facilities all with travel time d from A, is given by




Proof: We assume that n is divisible by m. Let kj be the number of customers
assigned to facility j by the central planner. From the definition of the total system







We wish to find the values of kj that minimize Cm. First, observe that since the total
number of customers is n, then km = n−
∑m−1














Examining the rate of change of Cm with respect to the change in each kj, we have
∆Cm
∆kj




for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
We propose that k∗, the vector of assignments that minimizes the total system
cost, is given by k∗j =
1
m
n for all j. We need to show that k∗m has the same form as
that of k∗j for j = 1, . . . ,m − 1, that the proposed k∗ satisfies the system when the
rates of change are equated to zero, and that this solution yields a global minimum
of the cost function.
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n for kj in the rate of change expressions yields











n− 2n + 2n− 4
m
n = 0,
thus indicating that this is a local minima.
Finally, we observe that when k values are permitted to be non-integer, the Hessian
(matrix of second derivatives) of the continuous form of the cost function is positive
definite at every point. Therefore, the continuous form of the cost function is convex,
which implies that a local minimum is also the global minimum. The vector k∗ is
a local minimum of the continuous form of the cost function, and since it is also
integer-valued, this assignment of customers to locations is indeed a global minimum
of the true (integer-valued) cost function. We write Cm(k
∗) = C∗m.
All that remains is substituting the k∗j values into the original expression for total





















In this expression, the first term captures the travel time from the customer loca-
tion to facilities, while the second gives the congestion at the facilities. If all facilities
are equidistant from the customers, the assignment that minimizes congestion is that
which splits customers equally among facilities.
We can also characterize the ratio between a centralized solution and a decentral-
ized one in the case where customers choose based only on travel times.
Corollary 5 In the case in which all facilities have equal travel time d from customer
location A and αj = 0 for all j, the price of anarchy is O(m).
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Proof: Suppose that all facilities have travel time d from customer location A, except
for facility m, whose travel time is d − ε. (Equivalently, imagine that all customers
make the same choice of facility, leading to the worst possible congestion.) Then in
the decentralized scenario all customers will choose facility m, and the realized cost
of these choices is n(d− ε) + n2. Letting ε go to 0, the decentralized cost is nd + n2.
Thus, the ratio between the decentralized realization and the centralized optimal cost
is






This result is intuitive, for the worst congestion occurs when all customers choose the
same facility.
These ideas can also be extended to the case where the travel time, dAj, from the
common customer location A to facility j is general. We consider the same problem of
a centralized planner determining the assignment of customers to facilities to minimize
the total travel time plus congestion, using the latency functions already described.
Under this scenario, the optimal central cost can be expressed in closed form.
Theorem 13 The cost of the optimal assignment of n customers, all of whom are
located at A, to m facilities j = 1, . . . ,m with travel times dAj from A, the minimum






















Proof: Assume n is divisible by m. Let kj be the number of customers assigned to

































for j = 1, . . . ,m− 1.













We must show that k∗m has the same form as k
∗
j for j = 1, . . . ,m−1, that the proposed
k∗ satisfies the system when the rates of change are equated to zero, and that this





























































Thus, the form of k∗m is the same as that of the other k
∗
j ’s.

































































We will now show that, by simplification and grouping, the rate of change expression
reduces to 0 as desired.
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[(m− 2)dAj + (m− 3)
∑
l 6=j,l<m
dAl + (m− 2)dAm].






− 2 = 2m
m
− 2 = 0.







2m− 4m + 4 + 2m− 4
2m
= 0.
4. Grouping the terms involving
∑









4− 2m + 2 + 2m− 6
2m
= 0.
5. Grouping the terms involving dAm gives
4
2m
− 1 + 2(m− 2)
2m
=
4− 2m + 2m− 4
2m
= 0.
Thus, the proposed k∗j ’s satisfy the equations in which the rates of change are set to 0.
Finally, the vector k∗ is the global minimum using the same argument as in Theorem
12, namely that the Hessian (matrix of second derivatives) of the continuous form of
the cost function is positive definite, k∗ is the global minimum of the continuous form
of the cost function, and since it is integer-valued, it is also the global minimum of
the true cost function.





j dAj + k
∗2
j ). The following steps outline this substitution.
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3. Combine the terms from Steps 1 and 2 for a single j:








































































• Combine terms involving dAj
∑












5. Rewrite based on simplification:


































6. Sum over all j:
m∑
j=1











































































−(m + 1)(m− 1)
4m2
=







































Thus, the optimal cost for the centralized problem is given by the equation pre-
sented. 2
Again, the first term comes from the facility congestion. However, the additional
terms now capture the trade-off between facility congestion and travel time. The
optimal assignment in the case with general travel times can be seen as an adjustment
to that in the case with equal travel times. If we fix all travel times except dAj, we
see that as dAj increases it is less attractive to assign customers to facility j. Travel
time begins to have more influence in the assignment decision than congestion. But
holding dAj fixed and varying the travel times to other facilities, we see that if other
facilities require long travel times we would like to assign some additional customers
to facility j. As before, we can characterize the ratio of the optimal cost and the cost
of a decentralized solution in the case with αj = 0 for all j.
Corollary 6 Suppose travel times to facility j from customer location A, denoted by
dAj, are sorted in non-decreasing order such that dA1 < dA2 < . . . < dAm and that
αj = 0 for all j. Then the price of anarchy is O(m).
Proof: The realized cost of the decentralized choices is ndA1 + n
2, since all cus-
tomers choose the closest facility. Using the results of Theorem 13 on the form of the









































Again, this ratio is dominated by the number of customers but now the centralized
solution also has terms to account for the trade-off in travel time and congestion. We
note that the strict sorting of travel times is used here for a clear exposition but is
not necessary. In fact, a technique identical to that used in the proof of Corollary 5
in which a single facility has travel time at least ε less than any other facility can be
used to relax the supposition.
B.2 Computing the Price of Anarchy
In Section 2.5.3, we proved that the price of anarchy in the case where αj = 1 for
all j can be at least 2. Here we present a computational approach we developed
for determining the price of anarchy for any given instance of the Facility-Specific
Congestion Weights Problem when all α’s are equal to 1. This approach can also
be used to study the average price of anarchy computationally for different network
structures.
B.2.1 Optimization Model
To calculate the price of anarchy for a given instance of the fixed location problem,
we must find both the optimal solution and the Nash equilibrium solution with the
highest cost. The optimal solution is obtained by solving the planner’s problem
presented in Section 2.2. One approach for finding the worst Nash equilibrium is by
solving the following optimization problem, where binary decision variable xij is 1 if






















xlj) · xij ≤ dik +
n∑
l=1
xlk + 1 ∀ i, k 6= j (86)
xij ∈ B ∀i, j (87)
Constraint (85) ensures that each customer is served at exactly one facility. The
Equilibrium Condition of each individual with αj = 1 for all j (Inequality (1) from
Section 2.2) is enforced by Constraint (86), while Constraint (87) indicates the binary
decision variables. The objective function (84) in this representation is the same as
that in the central planner’s problem. However, we are now maximizing that value to
identify the equilibrium solution with greatest cost. By changing the objective sense
to minimization, we are also able to use this model to identify the best equilibrium
solution. This model is an important contribution since most research on network
games seeks to identify a single equilibrium solution, rather than the best or worst.
While this formulation is follows naturally from the system objective and the
Equilibrium Condition, both the objective function and Constraint (86) are nonlinear.





xlj ≤ dik +
n∑
l=1
xlk + 1 + M(1− xij) ∀ i, k 6= j
The objective function can also be converted to an equivalent linear expression
using the following procedure.
• Rewrite the objective function in matrix form as x′Qx + Dx, where D is the
matrix of travel times from customers to facilities and x′ and Q are given by




1 . . . 1 . . . 1 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
1 . . . 1 . . . 1 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
1 . . . 1 . . . 1 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 . . . 0 1 . . . 1 . . . 1 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 . . . 0 1 . . . 1 . . . 1 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 . . . 0 1 . . . 1 . . . 1 . . . 0
. . .
0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . 1

.
• Rewrite the objective function as x′Qx+Dx = x′(Q−λI)x+λx′x+Dx, where
λ is the largest eigenvalue of Q and I is the identity matrix.
• To find the largest eigenvalue, recall from linear algebra that for any square
matrix the number of nonzero eigenvalues is equal to the matrix rank. Clearly
the rank of Q is m. Moreover, the sum of the diagonal entries of a matrix is
equal to the sum of its eigenvalues. Therefore, for Q we have that the sum of
the eigenvalues must be nm. This implies that all nonzero eigenvalues of Q are
equal to n; therefore λ = n.
• Rewrite the objective function as x′(Q − nI)x + nx′x + Dx = x′(Q − nI)x +
nx + Dx, where the second expression follows from the fact that all xij′s are
binary.


















• Note first that x2ij = xij since the variables are binary. In addition, observe




















where yikj is a binary variable equal to 1 if both xij and xkj are 1 and 0 otherwise.
To enforce this relationship, add the constraints yikj ≤ xij and yikj ≤ xkj.


















Making use of the reformulated objective function and additional constraints, the

























xlj ≤ dik +
n∑
l=1
xlk + 1 + M(1− xij) ∀ i, k 6= j (90)
yikj ≤ xij ∀i, j, k 6= i (91)
yikj ≤ xkj ∀i, j, k 6= i (92)
xij ∈ B ∀i, j (93)
This formulation provides the main component of a solution procedure used to com-




Using the integer programming formulation just developed, we implement the follow-
ing procedure to study the price of anarchy.
1. Solve the planner’s problem to determine the central optimal solution.
2. Solve the integer program to identify the Nash equilibrium solution with the
highest cost.
(a) Initialize with the Nash equilibrium solution found using the minimum
cost flow procedure described in Theorem 1.
(b) Preprocess to eliminate variables if possible.
(c) Add a constraint requiring that the objective function value be less than
2.5 times the optimal solution, as known from the literature [8].
(d) Solve the integer program and report the cost of the worst Nash equilib-
rium.
3. Calculate the price of anarchy.
Steps 2a, 2b, and 2c were added to this solution procedure to reduce solution times
for the integer programming problem. In a small test study, the optimization software
did not find a feasible integer solution for many cases. Using knowledge about the
minimum cost flow transformation from Theorem 1 enabled the identification of such
a solution very quickly. Some variables can be preprocessed out of the formulation
based on the instance data. If a facility is located such that the travel time is greater
than dijmin + n − 1 from customer i, where jmin is i’s closest facility, then i will
never choose that facility. The associated assignment variable can be eliminated in
this case. Finally, the literature provides a known upper bound of 2.5 on the price
of anarchy. Further testing is needed to determine whether its inclusion can speed
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the computation times. Studies using this approach on different kinds of network
instances may help provide insight about general relationships between the number
of customers, the number of facilities, and the price of anarchy. They may also lead
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